The effect of leadership changes in Taipei and Beijing on the cross straits relationship by Donovan, Joseph R., Jr.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
1993-09
The effect of leadership changes in Taipei and
Beijing on the cross straits relationship
Donovan, Joseph R., Jr.






THE EFFECT OF LEADERSHIP CHANGES IN TAIPEI AND
BEIJING ON THE CROSS STRAITS RELATIONSHIP
by
Joseph R. Donovan Jr.
September 1993
Thesls Advisor: Claude A. Buss
Approved for publio release; distribution Is unlimited.
\\\093ma~~
98\9-63 2292519 3 •. o. 2 9 1 2 5/1 !I 11
uCUrrY CLASSMICATo o Tins PAGE
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE
Ia. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION lb. RESTRICTIVE MARKINGS
Unclassified
2a. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY 3. DISTRIBUTION/ AVAILABILITY OF REPORT
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
2b. DCLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE
4. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S) 5. MONITORING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)
6a. NAME OF PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 6b. OFFICE SYMBOL 7a. NAME OF MONITORING ORGANIZATION
Naval Postgraduate School (If Applicable) Naval Postgraduate School
NS
6c. ADDRESS (city, state, and ZIP code) 7b. ADDRESS (city, state, and ZIP code)
Monterey, CA 93943-5000 - Monterey, CA 93943-5100
8a. NAME OF FUNDING/SPONSORING 6b. OFFICE SYMBOL 9. PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER
ORGANIZATION (If Applicable)
U.S. State Department FSI
8c. ADDRESS (city, state, and ZIP code) 10. SOURCE OF FUNDING NUMBERS
C St. NW PROGRAM PROJECT TASK WORK UNIT
Washington, D.C. 20520 ELEMENT NO. NO. NO. ACCESSION NO.
1i. TITLE (Include Security Classification)
The Effect of Leadership Changes in Taipei and Beijing on the Cross Straits Relationship
12. PERSONAL AUTHOR(S)
Joseph R. Donovan Jr.
13a. TYPE OF REPORT 13b. TIME COVERED 14. DATE OF REPORT (year, month.day) 15. PAGE COUNT
Master's Thesis FROM 09/92 TO 09/93 September 1993 112
16. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTATION
The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of
Defense or the U.S. Government.
17. COSATI CODES 18. SUBJECT TERMS (continue on reverse if necessary and identif- by block number)
FIELD GROUP SUBGROUP Asia, China, Taiwan, People's Republic of China, Republic of China, Beijing
Taipei, Cross Straits Relationship, Leadership Change
19. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)
It is unlikely that the fast growing relationship between Taiwan and the China mainland will lead to political re-unification. The operational codes of new leaders
in Taipei and Beijing will be shaped by the distinct forces at work on both sides of the straits and by the dynamic of the contacts themselves. Taiwan leaders will be selected
by an increasingly pluralistic system but one which remains biased heavily in favor of the ruling KMT. A new generation of Taiwanese KMT leaders will pursue policies
that contribute first to the island's security and prosperity and only secondly benefit any notion of a greater China. Power in Beijing is shifting to a generation that is the
product of the Chinese Communist system. Beijing leadership contenders' pressing need to: consolidate factional networks in the absence of art institutionalized succession
process; strengthen the legitimacy of the Communist Party; and re-integrate Hong Kong into China suggest that they may place low priority on re-unification with Taiwan
Despite the absence of a compelling interest in political re-unification, the increasing scope and complexity of cross straits ties constitutes a dynamic that will
stimulate greater cooperation between Taiwan and the mainland. This combination of the powerful forces expanding cross straits ties and the absence of
incentives for new leaders to pursue overall political integration may lead to the evolution of an enity that is less than a modem nation-state but more than a
trading bloc.
20 DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF ABSTRACT 21. ABSTRACT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
IS] UNCLASSIFIED/UNLIMITED] SAME AS RPT. 0 DTIC USERS Unclassified
22a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL 22b. TELEPHONE (Include Area 22c. OFFICE SYMBOL
Claude A. Buss Code) NSA
(408) 656-2935
DD FORM 1473, 84 MAR 83 APR edition may be used until exhausted SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE
All other editions are obsolete Unclassified
i
Approved for public release, distribution is unlimited
The Effect of Leadership Changes in Taipei and Beijing on
the Cross Straits Relationship (U)
by
Joseph R. Donovan Jr.
U.S. Department of State
B.S.F.S Georgetown University 1973
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of







Claude A. Buss, Thesis Advisor
David Winterfor, SeMcond Reader




It is unlikely that the fast growing relationship between Taiwan and
the China mainland will lead to political re-unification. The operational
codes of new leaders in Taipei and Beijing will be shaped by the distinct
forces at work on both sides of the straits and by the dynamic of the contacts
themselves. Taiwan leaders will be selected by an increasingly pluralistic
system but one which remains biased heavily in favor of the ruling KMT. A
new generation of Taiwanese KMT leaders will pursue policies that
contribu•te first to the island's security and prosperity and only secondly
benefit any notion of a greater China. Power in Beijing is shifting to a
generation that is the product of the Chinese Communist system. Beijing
leadership contenders' pressing need to: consolidate factional networks in the
absence of an institutionalized succession process; strengthen the legitimacy
of the Communist Party; and re-integrate Hong Kong into China suggest that
they may place low priority on re-unification with Taiwan.
Despite the absence of a compelling interest in political re-unification,
the increasing scope and complexity of cross straits ties constitutes a dynamic
that will stimulate greater cooperation between Taiwan and the mainland.
This combination of the powerful forces expanding cross straits ties and the
absence of incentives for new leaders to pursue overall political integration
may lead to the evolution of an entity that is less than a modern nation-state
but more than a trading bloc.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
It is unlikely that the fast growing relationship between Taiwan and the China
mainland will lead to political unification. However, short of a declaration of Taiwan
independence or the collapse of central authority in Beijing, both improbable, cross straits
interaction will expand and propel both sides to increase bilateral cooperation.
Decisions taken by leaders in the post-Lee Teng-hui and post-Deng Xiaoping eras
will determine the extent and direction of cross straits interaction. The parameters for
leadership decisions will be set by the operational codes of leaders in Taipei and Beijing.
These operational codes will be shaped by their common traditions and by the separate
political, economic and social changes occurring on both sides of the straits. A third factor
shaping these operational codes will be the dynamic of the contacts themselves.
The next generation of leaders in the Republic of China (ROC) will be selected by an
increasingly pluralistic system but one which remains biased heavily in favor of the ruling
Nationalist Party (KMT). The KMT has perpetuated its rule in Taiwan by admitting
native Taiwanese into leadership positions, co-opting moderate opposition policies, and
relaxing political controls. These steps have shifted the underlying rationale for KMT rule
away from the premise that the ROC will someday re-capture the China mainland. The
KMTs new legitimacy rests on its ability to provide effective government that reflects the
aspirations of the residents of Taiwan. This new generation of Taiwanese KMT leaders
will be Taiwan-centered. They will pursue polices that contribute first to the island's
security and prosperity and only secondly benefit any notion of a greater China. Whereas
their Mainlander predecessors were Chinese first and residents of Taiwan second, these
new leaders will be Taiwanese fast and Chinese second.
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The development of law and political institutions in Taiwan, represented by the
emergence of a free press and political opposition, precludes any meaningful re-unification
talks between the KMT and the CCP. In an increasingly pluralistic Taiwan, any
negotiations aimed at re-unification with the PRC must command the overwhelming
support of the Taiwan populace. Strong popular support for re-unification in a prosperous
and pluralistic Taiwan is doubtful.
Reflecting popular sentiment, new ROC leaders will be less inclined to undertake
potentially risky steps toward political re-unification and equally unwilling to proclaim
Taiwan independence. Closely affiliated with the Taiwanese business community, these
Taiwanese KMT leaders will perceive tangible benefits in expanding cross straits trade,
investment and social interaction. However, they will view economic and social ties as an
end in themselves, not as the beginning of a process leading to political re-unification. The
ROC leadership's attitude is perhaps best summed up in a popular saying: "Unification is
what you can say but don't do; independence is what you do but can't say."
Despite challenges posed by the Tiananmen protests in 1989 and the Democracy Wall
movement in 1978-79, the CCP remains entrenched atop the People's Republic of China's
(PRC) political system--at least in the short run. The next generation of Chinese leaders
will be self-selected by senior members of the ruling elite. Power in Beijing is gradually
shifting from the generation that participated in the Chinese Communist Revolution to a
generation that is the product of the Chinese Communist system.
Since there is no institutionalized succession process, the succession struggle will be
characterized by intense factional maneuvering. Lacking the broad-based personal
experience and ties that Deng and Mao built up through the years to consolidate their
power, leadership contenders will need to generate continuing payoffs to retain members
in fluid networks that span the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the People's Liberation
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Army (PLA), and the State bureaucracy. Economic benefits from cross straits ties will
enhance the ability of faction patrons to reward their clients.
A crucial problem confronting future PRC leaders will be strengthening the legitimacy
of the Chinese Communist Party. After the Cultural Revolution, Deng successfully made
his vision of modernization through economic reform the underlying rationale for CCP
rule. New leaders will have to add a political component to Deng's vision. Unless the
CCP undertakes political reforms better to reflect popular opinion, external challenges to
the CCPs preeminent position will intensify.
The pressing need to consolidate factional networks, and strengthen the legitimacy of
the CCP, combined with a daunting list of additional problems that include an increase in
regional autonomy and the return of Hong Kong, suggests the PRC's next leadership may
place low priority on re-unification with Taiwan. Preoccupied with more pressing issues,
PRC leaders will be reluctant to develop new policy initiatives or make major concessions
aimed at opening re-unification talks. They will also be unwilling to risk straining weak
factional links to the PLA by launching risky military operations designed to pressure
Taiwan. Instead, Chinese leaders may engage in a form of incremental problem-solving
that broadens and facilitates existing ties but obscures the PRC's ultimate political
objective.
Despite the absence of a compelling interest in political re-unification, the increasing
scope and complexity of cross straits contacts constitutes a dynamic that will stimulate
greater cooperation between Taipei and Beijing. Coping with the myriad details involving
the large-scale movements of people and goods between Taiwan and the mainland will
demand extensive institutional arrangements. This combination of the powerful forces
expanding cross straits ties and the absence of incentives for new leaders to pursue overall
political integration may lead to the evolution of an entity that is less than a modem-nation
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state but more than a trading bloc. What may emerge is a distinctly Chinese entity that is




Relations between Taiwan and the China mainland' have undergone a remarkable
transj)rmation since the lifting of martial law on Taiwan in July 1987. An increasingly
intricate web of economic and cultural interaction has eclipsed the uneasy military
confrontation that characterized relations between the two sides of the Taiwan Straits
from 1949 until 1986. Although the impetus behind this interaction has come from the
private sector on Taiwan and at the local and regional level on the mainland, political
decisions in Beijing and Taipei created a climate in which these contacts have flourished.
Decisions made by the next generation of leaders will help determine whether cross straits
interaction leads to re-unification, Taiwan independence or something altogether different.
At a minimum, future Chinese leaders will be confronted with the difficult task of
managing these ties in the absence of an overall political framework.
This thesis examines the effects of generational change in Taipei and Beijing on the
future of the cross straits relationship. Leadership elites in Taiwan and the China mainland
are undergoing separate but equally dramatic changes. In Taiwan, the transfer of political
power from the aging, mainland-born Chinese leaders who accompanied Chiang Kai-shek
to the island in 1949 to younger, "Taiwanese" Chinese whose ancestors first came to the
islanI from Fujian and Guangdong Provinces three hundred years ago is nearing
IThe island of Taiwan is under the de facto control of authorities in Taipei. These authorities refer to
themselves as the Republic of China (ROC). The China mainland is de facto controlled by authorities in
Beijing. These authorities refer to themselves as the People's Republic of China (PRC). Both sets of
authorities claim sovereignty over Taiwan and the China mainland. References in this paper to Taiwan,
Taipei, Republic of China (ROC) or the Taiwan government relate to the de facto control of Taiwan only.
References to the China mainland, Beijing, the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the mainland
government relate to the de facto control of the China mainland only.
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completion. On the China mainland, the last veterans of the Communist Revolution are
gradually being replaced by a generation of leaders that are the products rather than the
creators of the Chinese Communist system.2 The perspectives of both sets of new elites
will likely differ markedly from their predecessors'.
The focus then shifts to the ongoing processes in Taiwan and the mainland that will
effect the selection of these new elites and elite perceptions of the cross straits
relationship. A key assumption of this paper is that domestic factors are the primary
determinant in shaping leadership selection and perspectives. As a result, this thesis
concentrates primarily on the internal processes at work in Taiwan and the mainland.
External factors are considered only when it appears that they might exert primary
influence over domestic considerations.
A second assumption is that individuals and their decisions matter--man is not subject
to identifiable, objective rules but insiead is limited only by individual and group
perceptions of reality. An individual's unique spiritual and physical make-up ultimately
affects the outcome of specific decisions. Over time, patterns of behavior arising from
these decisions become incorporated into an individual's "operational code", defined as a,
"...set of beliefs about basic issues concerning the nature of politics and political
action .... "3 This operational code is a key factor shaping choices of "strategy and tactics"
and the "...structuring and weighing of alternative courses of action." 4
2David Bachman, "The Limits on Leadership in China," Asian Survey, Vol. XXXII, No. 11, November
1992, 1050.
3Alexander L. George, "The 'Operational Code': A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders




The operational code- of leaders in the post-Lee Teng-hui and post-Deng Xiaoping
eras will be shaped by their traditions and by the separate political, economic and social
changes occurring on both sides of the straits as well as the dynamic of the contacts
themselves. These traditions and changes are reflected in Taiwan and the mainland's
political cultures and in their dominant political institutions. External factors, particularly
the international trade environment will also influence the perspectives of these new
leaders. Understanding these forces provides insight into the perception of a new
generation of elites as to the costs and benefits of ties across the straits.
The political cultures of the ROC and PRC share a common tradition. In imperial
China, government was highly personal: The ruler functioned as a paternal figure in a
hierarchical structure. He was responsible for the maintenance of stability and order in
society. 5 For the Chinese people, stability and order provided the key to their prosperity
and security. The people held their ruler accountable for providing effective government
that avoided natural and man-made threats to their prosperity and security.
To maintain stability, a ruler needed to dominate the Confucian-scholar
administrative structure. This administrative structure provided a r,!er with the means to
legitimize his rule. Through the correct performance of rituals and adherence to customs,
administered by the Confucian-scholars, a ruler demonstrated his v.rtue and morality by
placating the forces of Heaven (in Chinese: "tiar.") A central myth of the Chinese culture
was that a "...ruler's exemplary and benevolent conduct manifesting his personal virtue (in
Chinese: "de") drew the people to him and gave him the Mandate (of Heaven)." 6
5John K. Fairbank, The Cambridge History of China: Volume 10: Late Ch'ing. 1800-1911. Part 1, ed.
Dennis Twitchett and John K. Fairbank, (Cunbridge, London, New York and Melbourne: Cambridge
University Press, 1978), 22.
6John King Fairbank, China: A New History, Cambridge. Massachusetts and London, England: Belknap
Press, 1992), 110-111.
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The Mandate of Heaven also required that a ruler provide order by suppressing
domestic strife and repelling invaders. To accomplish this task, a leader needel to firmly
control the military apparatus. Throughout Chinese history, control or at least placation
of military authorities has been a precondition for the survival of civilian rulers. The Neo-
Confucian scholar-officials who staffed the government bureaucracy might disdain the
military, but they did not dispute the emperor's need to monopolize military force in order
to preserve the dynasty. Imperial autocracy, embodied in the emperor's command of the
military, provided a Chinese ruler with an "...autonomous source of innovation or sudden
intervention" that served as a useful counterweight to overcorme the inertia and excesses
inherent in the bureaucratic system.7
Reflecting traditional Chinese society, civil control of the military was personalized in
the relationship of the ruler to military leaders. A weakening of these ties could have
disastrous consequences. For example, the ultimate demise of the Qing Dynasty in 1911
was precipitated by an alliance of military officers and local gentry.8 I he chaos of the
ensuing "Warlord" period occurred when no effective civil-military leadership relationship
coalesced at the center that could withstand the twin pressures of foreign incursions and
domestic unrest.
Although dynastic change in Imperial China was accomplished by military force, the
establishment of a new dynasty required a degree of legitimacy. The Chinese philosopher
Mencius is credited with providing a rationale to legitimize a new dynasty. Mencius
71bid., 111.
gMichael D. Swaine, The Military & Political Succession in China: Leadership Institution Beliefs, (Rand,
1992 ), 3.
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reasoned that an immoral Chinese ruler forfeited the right to rule.9 The Mandate of
Heaven would be rewarded to a successor who first overthrew the immoral ruler and
subsequently acquired virtue (legitimacy) by restoring order and stability.
These twin concepts of legitimacy and authority through force form the basis of the
contemporary political cultures in the ROC and PRC. Political power resides in the hands
of a paternal figure who rules by manipulating the bureaucratic and military institutions.
The failure of a ruler either to legitimize his rule through bureaucracy or maintain his
authority through force, jeopardizes his rule and encourages new claimants to the Mandate
of Heaven.
In 1949 in both Taipei and Beijing, political power was held by individuals not
institutions. Mao Zedong and Chiang Kai-shek operated above law and institutions. Both
leaders created political institutions to perpetuate their rule. These institutions have
survived their creators. For nearly a half century, Taiwan's Nationalist Party (KMT) and
the mainland's Chinese Communist Party (CCP) have been the supreme political
institutions in their respective societies. Despite their long-standing rivalry, both political
institutions share similar Leninist roots. Influenced heavily by Soviet Communism, both
organizations "emphasized tight organization, unquestioning discipline and the use of
propaganda to manipulate the masses."10  Party units, mirroring and dominating
government structure, extended from the center to the local level. In most instances party,
government and military organizations were indistinguishable. Despite these common
roots, since 1949, the KMT and the CCP have formulated sharply different responses to
9Hugh B. O'Neill, Companion to Chinese History, (New York and Oxford: Facts On File Publications,
1987), 187.
10Frank Ching, "KMT Must End Leninist Style and Become a Modem Party" Far Eastern Economic
Reiew, 15 April 1993, 30.
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the dilemma posed by the increased political aspirations that accompany economic
modernization.
The next chapter of this thesis examines the unique factors that affect leadership
selection and perspectives in the Republic of China (ROC). Chapter III focuses on the
effect of the distinct forces at work in the People's Republic of China (PRC). Chapter IV
describes the evolution and present scope of cross straits ties. The final section contains a
summary and conclusions.
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I. GENERATIONAL CHANGE ON TAIWAN
Taiwan's history and its recent political and economic development ensure that the
perspectives of the island's future ruling elites will be increasingly Taiwan-centered. Prior
to 1988, members of the ROC's leadership had been born and educated on the China
mainland. Their collective outlook was shaped by resistance to the Japanese during World
War II and by their bitter defeat at the hands of Mao Zedong and the Chinese Communist
Party on the mainland. Members of this group shared a common perception of Taiwan as
a temporary refuge from which they would one day return to the mainland in triumph.
While they were the architects of Taiwan's current economic prosperity and growing
political pluralism, for them, Taiwan existed in a universe dominated by the rest of China.
All of their considerable achievements in Taiwan were measured in relation to political and
economic developments on the mainland. In a zrA sense they were Chinese first and
residents of Taiwan second.
Time and demography have taken their toll on this group. Taiwan's future leaders
will be less the offspring of the KMT forces which fled to Taiwan in 1949 and more the
descendants of the Han Chinese whose ancestors first came to Taiwan over three hundred
years ago and who comprise the overwhelming majority of the island's population. The
shared experiences of these "Taiwanese" Chinese include fifty years of Japanese colonial
rule that injected Japanese cultural and social patterns of behavior into a traditional
southern Chinese culture. Most importantly, Taiwan is home to this group. This new elite
is Taiwanese first and Chinese second. They will perceive policies and institutions
primarily in terms of their relevance to Taiwan's security and economic prosperity.
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The operational code of this new elite is best understood in terms of Taiwan's
historical context and recent political and social developments on the island.
A. TRADITIONAL INTERACTION
Taiwan has traditionally played a peripheral role in Chinese history. Located 100
miles off the mainland coast, large scale Han Chinese settlement of Taiwan did not begin
until the early 17th Century."I When the Dutch established their settlement in Taiwan in
1624, Taiwan's Chinese population1 2 numbered approximately 25,000.13 Immigration
intensified first under the Dutch and later during the rule of the Ming loyalist General
Cheng Cheng-kung (Koxinga). In 1683, the Ming forces were defeated and Taiwan was
brought under the rule of the Qing Dynasty. During most of the Qing period (1683-
1895), Taiwan was regarded as a frontier region of Fujian Province; immigration from the
mainland was officially restricted. The Qing dynasty provided Taiwan with, "...only a
semblance of law and order and made minimal effort to develop the island."' 4 Despite
official restrictions, migration continued and by 1780 the Chinese in Taiwan numbered
700,000-800,000.15
I ILeonard H.D. Gordon, Taiwan: Studies in Chinese Local History, (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1970), 1.
12The Chinese were not the original settlers of Taiwan. The origin of the aboriginal people's who first
came to the island about five thousand years ago is unclear but it is generally believed that they came from
the South Pacific ' :a New Guinea and the Philippines. According to a 1990 ROC census, Taiwan's nine
major aboriginal tribes have a total population of 330,000 or 1.7 percent of the island's population.
13 Shaw Yu-ming, "Modem History of Taiwan: An Interpretive Account," China and the Taiwan Issue,
ed. Chiu Hungdah, (New York: Praeger, 1979), 9.
141bid., 12
15 Yin Ping, "New Enthusiasm for Local History," trans. Fred Steiner, Free China Revew, Vol 42 No.3
March 1992, 34.
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The Qing Court's attitude toward the island did not change until the 1880's. In
response to Japanese and French incursions on Taiwan, Beijing granted the island
provincial status, belatedly instituted a series of reforms and encouraged new settlements.
By 1887 the island's population had reached 3.2 million.16 When Beijing ceded Taiwan to
Japan in 1895 under the Treaty of Shimonoseki, the island's focus of attention shifted
away from the Chinese mainland and toward Japan.
Fifty years of Japanese rule ended in 1945 but the high hopes with which the Chinese
on Taiwan greeted their liberation were soon dashed by the corruption of KMT-appointed
Provincial Governor Chen Yi.17  Conditions worsened steadily under Chen's
administration culminating in the February 28, 1947 Taiwan Incident, a spontaneous
Taiwanese uprising against KMT rule. Chen's behavior and the brutal repression which
followed the February 28 uprising led to tensions between Taiwanese and Mainlanders
which persist today.
B. TAIWANESE AND MAINLANDERS
The dominant paradigm in post 1945 Taiwan has been this tension between
'Taiwanese' and 'Mainlanders'. 'Taiwanese' are descendants of Han Chinese, primarily
from southern China, who settled in Taiwan prior to the Japanese colonial period. Within
Taiwan this group is further subdivided into the majority whose ancestors came from
Fujian Province and a smaller group of Hakka Chinese from Guangdong Province.
"Mainlanders" are Han Chinese and their offspring who fled the China mainland at the
16Michael H. Hunt, "Chinese Foreign Relations in Historical Perspective," China's Foreign Relations in
te198'. ed. Harry Harding (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1984), 13.
17 Gordon, 45.
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time of the Chinese Communist Revolution. By 1989, only 2.8 (14.3%) million of
Taiwan's 20 million people were Mainlanders; the rest were overwhelmingly Taiwanese. I
1. Evolution to Pluralism
When Chiang Kai-shek led the 1.5 million remnants19 of the Nationalist forces to
Taiwan in 1949, he brought with him political and military organizations and a national
government which he imposed over the existing provincial and local governments in
Taiwan. The result was a confusing and overlapping bureaucracy in which all meaningful
political power was concentrated in Chiang as President.
Under this system the ROC government prohibited the formation of new political
parties and suppressed those already in existence.20 All local government and political
activities were controlled and supervised by the KMT. KMT membership, particularly at
senior levels, was reserved almost exclusively for Mainlanders. Taiwanese alienation from
politics was so extensive in the 1950's that even the political opposition was composed
primarily of Mainlanders or those who had studied and lived on the China mainland
immediately prior to 1949.21
Excluded from political and military power by the appointment of Chiang's
Mainlander supporters to virtually all key positions,22 the Taiwanese majority "...pursued
18Tien Hung-mao, "Transformation of an Authoritarian Party State: Taiwan's Development Experience,"
Political Change in Taiwan, ed. Chung Tun-jen and Stephan Haggard, (Boulder and London: Lynne
Rienner Publishers, 1992), 36.
19Cheng Tun-jen and Stephan Haggard, "Regime Transformation in Taiwan: Theoretical and
Comparative Perspectives," Political Change in Taiwan, 4.
20Yung-mau Chao and Michael Y.M Kau, "Local Government and Political Development in Taiwan, In
•,Ibh, Winter 1993, 221.
21Ibid., 228.
2 2Tien, "Social Change and Political Development in Taiwan," Taiwan in a Time of Transition, ed.
Harvey Feldman et al. (New York: Paragon House, 1988), 12.
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economic advancement and social mobility. Not only were economic resources diffused in
a relatively fragmented private sector, they were largely in the hands of Taiwanese." 23
Chiang institutionalized this monopoly on political power in Mainlander hands
through the "Provisional Amendment for the Period of Mobilization Against the
Communist Rebellion" and later the "Act of Election and Recall of Public Officers During
the Period of Mobilization Against the Communist Rebellion." Ostensibly to maintain the
ROC's claim to sovereignty over all of China, those decrees froze membership in the
ROC's Legislative Yuan; National Assembly; and Control Yuan. 24 Membership in those
bodies was restricted to representatives chosen in the Nationalist's last mainland elections
in 1947-8.25 Supplemental elections for a limited number of new Taiwan members were
not held until 1969. Even after that date, the Legislative Yuan, National Assembly and the
Control Yuan were dominated by elderly Mainlander members.
C. EXPANSION OF REGIME LEGITIMACY
1. KMT Reform
In the early 1970's the KMT began to co-opt native Taiwanese into upper-middle
leadership positions in the party and the government. The KMT's decision to gradually
admit Taiwanese into the party began a process that allowed the Taiwanese to assume
gradually the dominant position in party and government institutions. Several factors may
have convinced the Mainlander KMT elders that they needed to broaden the legitimacy of
23Haggard and Cheng, 10.
24The National Assembly can amend the ROC constitution and elect the President. The Control Yuan
exercises power of audit and investigation.
25When elderly members began to die, membership in these bodies was expanded to include anyone who
had participated in the 1947 elections. This resulted in embarrassing situations where legislators who had
received a handful of votes in the 1947 elections assumed leading roles in the Legislative Yuan and the
National Assembly and the Control Yuan.
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their rule. Since 1949, KMT rule of Taiwan had rested on the notion that the ROC central
government apparatus would eventually resume control over China proper. By 1971 this
claim had been eroded by more than twenty years of Communist rule on the mainland. 26
Domestically, the party had been shaken by the unexpectedly strong showing of the
predominantly Taiwanese opposition forces in the 1969 supplementary Legislative Yuan
elections. In that election, non-KMT candidates won 27.3% of the contested seats and
24% of the total vote.27
International support for the regime was also waning: Taiwan was expelled from
the United Nations in 1971 in favor of the PRC; the Japanese government withdrew its
recognition of the ROC and established diplomatic relations with Beijing in 1972; and in
May 1973 the U.S. established ? Liaison Office in Beijing.
2. Economic and Social Change
The decision to recruit Taiwanese into the KMT was also influenced heavily by
the island's rapid economic progress. During the 1960's and 1970's Taiwan's economy
grew at an average rate of approximately 10 percent annually while maintaining an
equitable distribution of income and a relatively low level of inflation. Per capita income
increased from US$387 in 1970 to US$7,510 in 1989. By 1996 it is expected to reach
US$14,000.28
In addition, Taiwan's social structure was undergoing a period of rapid change.
Partly as a result of economic change, the island was becoming rapidly urbanized and
26Tien Hung-mao, "Transformation of an Authoritarian Party State: Taiwan's Development Experience,"
40.
27Lui Fei-lung, "The Electoral System and Voting Behavior in Taiwan," Political Change in Taiwan,
170.
281Harry Harding, A Fragile Relationship: The United States and China Since 1972, (Washington, D.C.:
The Brookings Institution, 1992), 346.
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industrialized. These changes were accompanied by a weakening of social order, and a
rise in environmental and infrastructure problems that affected the daily lives of all Taiwan
residents. All of these factors contributed to an environment that encouraged middle class
Taiwanese and Mainlanders to "engage in political reflection and criticism."29
The KMTs successful recruitment efforts focused on Taiwan's emerging upper
middle class. This group was composed of affluent Taiwanese who had prospered as
member's of the island's fragmented and relatively unrestrained business community.
Wealthy business families regarded political power as the most effective method of
ensuring that government would not intrude on their business activities.
3. Elderly Mainlanders Step Down
By the late 1980's the elderly and increasingly enfeebled Mainlander legislators
were a major embarrassment to the ROC government. Fewer controls on the media
allowed the opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) to focus public attention on
the lack of representativeness in ROC government institutions. Despite public relations
and financial enticements, the elderly Mainlanders clung to power. In 1990 the ROC's
highest judicial institution, the Council of Grand Justices, with the "...apparent backing of
the KMT authorities exercised its judicial review by setting the end of 1991 as the deadline
for involuntary retirement of these members, thus clearing the legal ground for democratic
transformation of the parliamentary bodies .... -30
The retirement of 469 National Assembly, 81 Legislative Yuan and 15 Control
Yuan elderly Mainlander members in December 199P13 heralded a new era in which
29Chao and Kau, 228.
30Tien, "Transformation of an Authoritarian Party State: Taiwan's Development Experience," 33.
3 1China News Agency, 17 December 1991. Trans. E=JI, 17 December 17 1991.
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central government institutions more closely reflected the Taiwan polity. The results of
the December 1992 Legislative Yuan election illustrate the extent of generational and
subethnic change in ROC government institutions. One hundred and four members of the
161 member body were newly elected 32; only 35 members were Mainlanders. 33 The
average of the Legislative Yuan members was 45; eighty percent had college or advanced
degrees. 34
4. Growth of the Opposition
Regime legitimacy has also been bolstered by the legalization of opposition
forces. In the post-1949 period, serious opposition to KMT rule of the ROC was
repressed. Under Martial Law, in effect since 1949, opposition parties were outlawed.
Limited political opposition was tolerated at the local level and under the auspices of a
weak organization known as the Dangwai (outside the party). Potentially serious
challenges to KMT rule, such as occurred in Chungli in 1977 and Kaohsiung in 1979 were
suppressed violently and the organizers were imprisoned.
In 1982 a group of moderate opposition politicians, including Kang Ning-hsiang,
established the "Dangwai Campaign Assistance Association" to plan opposition campaign
tactics. The group published a document, "A Common Political View," that would
provide the intellectual underpinnings of the opposition movement. The document
advocated that:




(1) the future of Taiwan should be determined jointly by the 18 million inhabitants
of Taiwan and (2) the government on Taiwan should formulate the Basic Law in
accordance with the spirit of the constitution and the political realities of Taiwan,
nullify the Temporary Provisions suspending parts of the constitution and giving the
president extraordinary powers, lift martial law, reorganize the national legislature,
and lift the bans on new political parties and new newspapers.35
In September of 1986, amidst signs of growing social unrest and economic
uncertainty, Dangwai politicians organized a formal political party--the Democratic
Progressive Party (DPP). Bowing to domestic and international pressure and perhaps
motivated by his own vision for a democratic Taiwan, President and KMT Party Chairman
Chiang Ching-kuo announced a series of reforms which had far-reaching effects on
Taiwan's political culture. The reforms broadened the regime's base of legitimacy,
lessened social conflict and bolstered Taiwan's international image, thus increasing the
confidence of the island's international investors and trade partners.36
In late 1986, Chiang announced steps to legalize opposition political parties and
relax press restrictions. The legitimization of the DPP, composed predominantly of native
Taiwanese, created new pressures for more political reform within the ROC government
and within the KMT. Credible performances by DPP candidates in the 1989, 1991 and
1992 elections increased the likelihood of Taiwan's transition into a true, two party
democratic system, albeit one dominated by the ruling KMT. DPP candidates performed
rarticularly well in the 1992 Legislative Yuan elections, capturing fifty seats in the 161
member body.37
35Chao and Kau, 229.
36Feldman, Tien, 2.
37julian Baum, "The Hollow Centre," Far Eastern Economic Review, 7 January 1993, 14.
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The two unifying themes for the DPP have been opposition to the KMT and
Taiwan independence. Despite widespread sentiment favoring separate status from the
mainland, the salience of the independence issue in a prosperous and pluralistic Taiwan is
questionable. Put simply, most residents are Taiwan are unwilling to risk the uncertain
economic, political and military consequences of an overt declaration of independence.
One lesson from the DPP's relatively poor showing in the 1991 National Assembly
elections and a key to its stronger performance in the 1992 Legislative Yuan elections was
an effort to mute independence rhetoric. In 1991, DPP candidates campaigned heavily on
the independence theme and captured only 24 percent of the total vote. Following the
National Assembly elections, DPP Chairman Hsu Hsin-liang, an ardent independence
supporter, called on his party to temporarily scale down its calls for Taiwan
independence.38 In the 1992 Legislative Yuan election campaign the DPP vote total rose
to 31 percent of the vote after DPP candidates diversified their rhetoric to include greater
emphasis on opposition to big money politics and the influence of "wealth and corporate
interests." 39
5. Limits to DPP Leadership
However the appeal of the DPP should not be overestimated. Historically, non-
KMT candidates have been able to win 20-30 percent of the contested seats and 25-35 of
the total election vote. However the non-KMT vote has never exceeded 35 percent.40
Despite its key role as a catalyst for political reform, three factors likely will
prevent the DPP from becoming the ruling power in Taiwan in the near future: 1)
38South China Morning Post, 23 December 1991, in f=DS, 23 December 1991, 65.
39Baum, "The Hollow Centre," 14-15.
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asymmetrical resources; 2) Taiwan's electoral structure; and 3) KMT co-option of
moderate opposition positions.
a. Asymmetrical Resources
The keys to winning elections in Taiwan are financial resources, factional and
party support and the mobilization of the candidate's substantial resources. 41 KMT
candidates are likely to maintain advantages in all of these areas in the near future. The
KMT has far greater access to capital and other resources vital to maintaining its power.
The ruling party's overwhelming financial resources gives it significant advantages over the
DPP in "nomination and assistance to candidates in the election system, political tradeoffs,
and political payoffs." 42
An additional benefit of the recruitment of Taiwanese into the Party
leadership was to augment the KMTs traditional sources of funds with those of Taiwanese
entrepreneurs. Seen from another perspective, by admitting Taiwanese businessmen into
the Party hierarchy, the KMT limited the DPP's access to this important source of funds.
The KMTs more than forty years of uninterrupted rule has created an
entrenched core of KMT members within the ROC bureaucracy that permeates local
government down to the section/department chief, school administrator and police
precinct level. DPP country magistrates and mayors have discovered after their election
that their effectiveness was constrained by a hostile or at best an aloof bureaucracy. The
KMT uses this bureaucratic core to provide the local population with various services:
4 1Ibid., 232.
42 Chao and Kau, 224.
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"offering jobs, mediating disputes, sponsoring social events, promoting local
construction." 43
Due to its intimate relationship with the government, the KMT has better
access to other resources. For example, DPP officials frequently charge that television
news reports are biased in favor of KMT positions and candidates.
b. Electoral System
Of even more importance, the DPP is unlikely to become the ruling party in
Taiwan without an extensive reform of Taiwan's electoral system. Under the current
system, similar to Japan's, Legislative Yuan (LY) and National Assembly members are
elected in multiple seat districts with voters casting a single vote for one candidate.
Candidates compete not only with opponents from other parties but also with candidates
from their own party. Voters are confronted with the dilemma of casting their vote for a
favorite candidate who may win easily or voting for a second or third preference who may
be engaged in a tight race.
The second lesson that the DPP learned in the 1991 National Assembly
election was that it should not nominate too many candidates. In that election, DPP
nominated candidates were soundly defeated because they split the vote available to the
opposition. In the 1992 LY elections the DPP fared better when it overcame factional
differences and nominated fewer candidates.44 Of course by nominating fewer candidates
the DPP can never hope to obtain a majority in the Legislative Yuan or the National
Assembly.
4 31bid.
44Baum, "The Hollow Centre," 14-15
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Like Japan, this system encourages the development of political factions.
Factionalism is widespread in Taiwan. An important function of county and city KMT
chairmen is to ensure that no local faction becomes disaffected to the extent that it breaks
with the ruling party and cooperates with the opposition.
This system has two effects: opposition parties will always elect a few
candidates; the opposition will remain in the minority. Taking a hypothetical example: the
KMT nominates five candidates for the six Legislative Yuan seats in Kaohsiung City's
northern election district. The KMT is conceding one seat to a DPP or independent
candidate. If the DPP nominates five candidates, these candidates may split the vote and
only one DPP candidate will be elected. If the DPP nominates two candidates both may
be elected. Either way, the DPP remains in the minority. Ironically the DPP opposes
changing this system claiming that its candidates would be seriously disadvantaged by
having to compete directly against KMT candidates in single seat election districts.
Under the ROC constitution, the President is elected indirectly by the
members of the National Assembly. Since National Assembly members are selected under
the system outlined above, the DPP has little chance of capturing the presidency. In 1992
the National Assembly seriously considered but postponed plans to amend the constitution
to allow direct election of the president. Opposition to this proposal originated in the
Mainlander wing of the KMT during the March 1992 Third Plenary of the KMT Central
Committee. This issue is likely to be considered again before the 1996 presidential
election. However, even if the constitution was amended and a DPP candidate was
elected president he would be confronted by a National Assembly and Legislative Yuan
firmly in KMT hands. A split government, would sharply constrain a DPP president's
ability to significantly change the ROC's policy toward the mainland or to declare
independence.
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c. KMT Co-option of Opposition Polices
The KMTs organizational flexibility has been accompanied by similar policy
flexibility. The KMT has successfully co-opted many of the issues first raised by Taiwan's
political opposition. The opposition agenda incorporated in the 1982, "A Common
Political View," has been largely implemented under KMT leadership. The Temporary
Provisions to the Constitution and Martial Law have been lifted as have press censorship
and the ban on new political parties. On one hand, the KMTs gradual implementation of
these policies is a victory for the opposition. On the other hand, co-option has stripped
the DPP of many of its most potent issues with which to attack KMT rule.
D. TAIWANESE LEADERS
The recruitment of Taiwanese into leadership positions has transformed the KMTs
ruling elite from a narrow group of mainlanders into a body which more accurately reflects
the background and views of the residents of Taiwan. In 1973 only three Taiwanese were
members of the KMT's Central Standing Committee, by 1988 this number had risen to 16
or 52% of total members. 45 The culmination of this process may have been Lee Teng-
hui's January 1993 use of his combined authority as ROC president and KMT chairman to
force the resignation of Mainlander Premier Hau Pei-tsun. Lee also successfully installed
his own candidate, Lien Chan, a Taiwanese, and blocked Hau's choice of a replacement.46
The transformation of the KMT was completed in August 1993 when Lee was re-elected
KMT chairman by the KMTs Fourteenth Party Congress despite opposition from some
influential Mainlanders.
4 5Tien, "Transformation of an Authoritarian Party State: Taiwan's Development Experience," 40-41.
46Julian Baum, "Mainlanders Adrift," The Far Eastern Economic Review. 11 February 1992, 17.
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The significance of this shift is twofold: by increasing the power of Taiwanese in the
party and government, the majority group on Taiwan now has an interest in preserving the
status quo on Taiwan. Currently, over seventy per cent of the KMT members are
Taiwanese. 47 Secondly, "...legitimacy of the regime..(has been)... modified to depend
increasingly on its effective governance of Taiwan rather than a fictitious claim of
sovereignty over the China mainland."48
1. A New Political Context
The political culture on Taiwan will continue to be heavily influenced by many of
the traditional aspects of Chinese culture. Relationships are hierarchical and personal.
Social order is derived less from the rule of law and more from family values and moral
authority.4 9 Factions, composed of individuals from the same clan or same part of Taiwan
remain the nucleus of the island's political culture.
At the same time, rapid economic development, urbanization and political change
are exerting pressures on traditional norms and patterns of behavior. A weakening of
family authority, perhaps an inevitable consequence of urbanization, leads many Taiwan
residents to perceive a continuing decline in social order. Political corruption, vote
buying, improper use of government office to further personal business interests spurs
public demands for greater rule by law.
Amidst this collision between tradition and modernity, two factors are likely to
play a significant role in Taiwan's political culture: the rise of a Taiwanese identity and the
continuing influence of the Mainlander minority.
47 Chao and Kau, 224.
48Tien, "Transformation of an Authoritarian Party State: Taiwan's Development Experience," 40.
49Chao and Kau, 233.
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Although Taiwan's economic progress has created a popular sense of pride in the
achievements of modem Taiwan, it has also led to simultaneous frustration that Taiwan's
international status is not commensurate with its new economic strength. This perception,
combined with the widespread belief that social change has failed to keep pace with
economic development, has led many Taiwanese to look to their roots for solutions to
their current problems. Historical consciousness is a key component in China's view of
itself and its place in the world. 50 The idea that an ideal past offers a model for the future
is a reoccurring theme in Chinese history. In Taiwan, this has led to a growing fascination
with Taiwanese history and particularly Taiwanese culture--the notion that Taiwan has
developed a culture distinct from the culture of the China mainland. For example, an
editorial in a prominent southern Taiwan newspaper has called for a revival of Taiwanese
culture in order to "restore ethics and morality" in Taiwan.5 1 The boom in travel to the
mainland has contributed to the belief that the outlook and experiences of the people on
Taiwan differ from those of their contemporaries on the China mainland.
Free from the linguistic and academic controls imposed by the ROC government
until the late 1980's, Taiwanese intellectuals, artists and academics are exploring their
roots on the island. The Taiwanese dialect of Chinese is heard more frequently on
television, and there has been an increase in Taiwanese studies, Taiwanese pop songs,
Taiwanese art exhibitions and public discussions of Taiwan's "Native Soil" literature.52
Local governments, including those in Kaohsiung and Pingtung Counties, have introduced
supplementary texts into schools to correct perceived slights to Taiwanese history and
5
°Michael H. Hunt, "Chinese Foreign Relations in Historical Perspective," in China's Foreign Relations in
th.1920s, 2.
51Min Chung Daily News, 31 March 1991.
521n Mandarin Chinese: Hsiang Tu Wen Hua.
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society in ROC Ministry of Education textbooks. Taiwan's oldest autonomous
newspaper, the Indendence Post has published an ambitious twenty-eight volume series
about Taiwan that includes topics on history and social development.53
Proponents of Taiwanese culture argue that Taiwanese culture has roots in
traditional Chinese culture much in the same way that American cultural roots lay in
British culture. However, advocates of a Taiwanese culture are quick to point out that
Taiwan and the mainland have had significantly different experiences during the past 100
years. From 1895 until 1945, the residents of Taiwan were heavily influenced by Japanese
educational and social mores. Since 1949, Taiwan's social, political and economic
development have diverged sharply from that of the mainland.54 Whereas modem Taiwan
is an amalgam of Chinese, Japanese and Western cultures, the contemporary mainland has
blended Chinese culture with Marxism-Leninism.
The attraction of a Taiwanese culture represents the search for a collective
identity long repressed, first by the Japanese and latter by the KMT. It indicates the
growth of a Taiwan-centered popular consciousness that will affect leadership
perceptions. The academic validity of a separate culture in Taiwan is less important than
the felt need to create a Taiwanese identity.
Despite the loss of its dominant position in party and government affairs, the
Mainlander segment of Taiwan society will continue to exert political influence. Control
of senior military positions and the bloc voting practices of the Mainlander community
ensure this group a voice in island-wide affairs. For example, in the 1992 Legislative Yuan
53Julian Baum, "Look Back in Anger," Far Eastern Economic Review, 27 February 1992,48-49.
54Emma Wu, "Local Scholars Take a Closer Look at Home," Free China Review, Vol. 42. No. 3 March
1992, 6-19.
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election, the pro-Hau Pei-tsun New KMT Alliance won II of the 12 seats that it
contested."5
Mainlander organizations like the New KMT Alliance and the conservative,
military backed Huang Fu-hsing group have little impetus to break from the KMT and
form their own political party. With their limited numbers and lack of appeal to a broader
constituency, these groups have little hope of attaining political leadership by peaceful
means. Splitting the KMT would undermine the two sources of their power: opposition to
Taiwan independence and the ability to provide extensive government social services to
retired military personnel.
Over time, Mainlander power will become more commensurate with their
percentage of Taiwan's population. Attrition will also occur in qualitative terms. As early
as 1985 the proportion of the island's population born on the mainland before the 1949
"...had dwindled from approximately 15 percent in 1950 to 5.7 percent..." 56 Second and
third generation Mainlanders, affected by Taiwanese values and intermarriage, are unlikely
to view reunification with China with the same intensity as their parents and grandparents.
2. New Perspectives
Taiwan's new ruling elite will emerge from among the Taiwanese members of the
KMT. These Taiwanese will be members of, or strongly supported by, the island's
aggressive business community. They will need to appeal to the aspirations of the
Taiwanese majority who are searching for an identity within the context of Chinese
tradition, modernity and their own historical experience. At the same time, Taiwan's
future leaders must accommodate the desires of the influential Mainlander minority who
55Baum, "The Hollow Centre," 14.
56Tien, "Transformation of an Authoritarian Party State: Taiwan's Development Experience," 43.
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adamantly oppose Taiwan independence. Both Mainlanders and the DPP will play
important roles in Taiwan's political culture. Mainlander influence will be felt in
opposition to Taiwan independence and as a brake on radical change. DPP political
activity will spur the KMT to embrace greater openness. The influence of both of these
groups precludes the ability of the KMT to conclude any meaningful agreements with the
PRC aimed at political re-unification.
Above all, the new generation of Taiwan's leaders will be Taiwan-centered. They
will tend to pursue polices that contribute first to the island's security and prosperity and
only secondly benefit any notion of a greater China.
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III. LEADERSHIP CHANGE ON THE MAINLAND
A. PERSONALITIES AND POLITICS
Beijing's post-Deng Xiaoping leadership will emerge from a political, economic, and
social milieu markedly different from that on Taiwan. Two related factors distinguish
leadership dynamics in Beijing from those in Taipei. First, the political processes at work
in the PRC rely more heavily on factions and factional networks. Second, the dominance
of factional networks over law and institutions in the PRC has prevented the
institutionalization of a leadership succession process. 57 This lack of an institutionalized
succession process ensures that leadership change will occur within the context of intense
factional competition aimed at dominating the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the
government bureaucracy and the People's Liberation Army (PLA). It also raises
fundamental questions about regime legitimacy and survivability following the demise of
China's current senior leader.
Reliance on personal loyalty networks is endemic in Chinese culture. In Imperial
China, factions flourished because "...the Emperor and his officials ruled men not space,
and loyalty was to individuals, to the family..." and only then to the system.58
Interpersonal relationships in Chinese society are structured around implicitly understood
patron-client rights and obligations. In this hierarchical relationship, the patron has a
responsibility to reward and protect his client in return for the client's loyalty and
57Harry Harding, Oreanizing China: The Problem of Bureaucracy 1949-1976, (Stanford, California:
Stanford University Press, 1981), 296.
58Marwyn S. Samuels, Contest for the South China Sea. (New York and London: Methuen, 1982), 51.
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obedience. Patron-client factions affiliate with other factions to form networks whose
functions include the accumulation and exercise of political power.59 Personal networks
are usually based on a
...shared sense of mutual interest and trust, often established through prolonged
and close proximity or common experience. Hence, institutional connections, as
well as regional backgrounds, generational and blood ties, and doctrinal viewpoints
do play important roles in the creation and evolution of guanxi (personal
relationship) networks.W
The role of factional networks adds a high degree of uncertainty to discussions of
leadership change in China. Important decisions, including key personnel changes, are
made in private and implemented through the CCP. Since influence is determined by
prestige, individuals with no official Party/Government/PLA positions at times may
exercise inordinate influence on PRC decision-making. Further, reliance on factions and
factional networks imposes unique constraints on political behavior. Factions depend on
the ability of a patron to provide a continuing stream of rewards to his clients: they tend to
expand and contract in proportion to a patron's political fortunes. Horizontal integration
is limited and clients in the same faction frequently compete with one another for the
patron's favor. This makes it difficult, if not impossible, for a faction to survive intact after
the demise of its elder patron.61 As a result, leadership change is influenced heavily by
intangible factors such as patrons' health problems and their order of death.
Since one faction seldom possesses sufficient resources to achieve complex political
objectives, factions enter into fluid alliances to curb the dominant position of another
59Andrew Nathan, China's Crisis: Dilemmas of Reform and Prospects for Democracy. (New York-




faction, promote favorable leadership changes or further policy aims. After achieving
these objectives, these alliances lose cohesion and tend to fracture. The result is a
succession of volatile factional networks.
Leadership of the PRC, and before 1949 the CCP, has been monopolized by patrons
of powerful factional networks whose influence transcended legal and institutional
authority. Members of this dynamic and contentious elite, composed primarily of men
who played an active role in China's Communist Revolution, exercised power through
factional networks that spanned the CCP, the government bureaucracy, and the PLA.
Both Mao and Deng have found it necessary to carefully cultivate and rranipulate personal
networks to perpetuate their rule.
In order to pave the way for hand-picked successors, both Mao and Deng have tried
but failed to institutionalize a succession system and reduce, if not eliminate, the influence
of competing factions. The root of their failure lies in that very primacy of personality and
factions over institutions and law in the PRC. At crucial points during their rule neither
Mao nor Deng were able to resist the temptation to use extra-legal factional connections
to eliminate real and perceived threats to their power from outside the
CCP/Govermment/PLA elite. By forming alliances with other factions within the elite,
Mao and Deng continued the dominance of factional networks over institutions and law.
B. THE STRUGGLE TO SUCCEED MAO (1966-1976)
1. Prelude: Mao, the Military and Mass Movements
As a prelude to what can be anticipated in the struggle to succeed Deng
Xiaoping, it is useful to begin with an analysis of the succession struggles that occurred
during the regime of Mao Zedong. Mao's rise to power relied heavily on military power
and the manipulation of mass movements. Mao also recognized the dangers inherent in
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the uncontrolled use of force. His solution was a "fused party-army elite."'62 in which the
Communist Party and ultimately Mao dominated military power. During the communist
revolutionary period, Mao refined the Nationalist government's practice of applying
"Leninist patterns of elitist political organization and indoctrination to the Chinese peasant
army." 63  Control of the PLA, concentrated in the hands of a small group of
revolutionaries loyal to Mao, was "highly centralized, vertically structured and very
personalized."64 During the protracted revolutionary struggle, these individuals served as
commanders or as political officers within a PLA Field Army, "presumably establishing
strong personal bonds on their shared combat experiences. "65 These ties continued after
1949 when these individuals moved into Party and government leadership positions.
Throughout his career Mao used the concept of the "mass line" to overcome
resistance to his power in the party-army elite. For Mao, mass movements were a means
of translating his will into policy by creating the illusion that he was reflecting popular
desires.66 He maintained that it was necessary to
...take the ideas of the masses (scattered and unsystematic ideas) and concentrate
them (through study turn them into concentrated and systematic ideas), then go to
the masses and propagate and explain these ideas until the masses embrace them as





66M. Rejai, Mao Tse-Tung on Revolution and War, M. Rejai, ed. (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books,
1970) 322.
6 7Mao Zedong, "Some Questions Concerning Methods and Leadership" (June 1943). Selected Works. III
(Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1965) 117-120) in Mao Tse-Tung on Revolution and War, 350.
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In his early years, mass movements allowed Mao to communicate his vision of a
new China. That vision is best summed up in his September 21, 1949 victory speech:
The Chinese have always been a great, courageous and industrious nation; it is
only in modem times that they have fallen behind, and that was due entirely to
oppression and exploitation by foreign imperialism and domestic reactionary
government ...ours will no longer be a nation subject to insult and humiliation. We
have stood up.68
In his later years, mass movements provided Mao with the opportunity to
reinvigorate his sagging political fortunes by manipulating forces outside of the
Party/Government/Military institutions. Mao hoped that these movements would
accomplish two aims: "identify, criticize" and if necessary remove corrupt officials; and
second, persuade the people to maintain socialist political values. 69
Unfortunately things did not work as Mao intended. The Hundred Flowers
Campaign of 1957 weakened Mao's position when it had to be suppressed after eliciting
an unexpected torrent of criticism and resentment of Communist rule.70 The 1958-9 Great
Leap Forward was an economic disaster that inflicted untold suffering on the Chinese
people.
In the period culminating in the Cultural Revolution, Mao had come to realize,
that "...fundamental Party decisions no longer rested fully in his hands." 71 In addition,
Mao believed that the twin evils of corruption and a bureaucracy isolated from the people
68Witold Rodzinski, The People's Republic of China: A Concise Political History, (New York: The Free
Press, 1988), 13.




threatened to undermine the Chinese Communist Revolution. He feared that the Chinese
Revolution was "losing impetus because of party conservatism and the lethargy of the
huge and cumbrous bureaucracy."72 Mao's solution to these dilemmas was to risk his
prestige and legitimacy on another mass movement to purge Chinese society of any
opposition to his rule. In the Cultural Revolution, Mao again went outside the system he
had created but could not always control to "increase popular participation in the Chinese
political process."173
With the assistance of factions led by Jiang Qing and Lin Biao, Mao was able to
dominate the media and obtain the acquiesce of the PLA. Students were mobilized into
Red Guard units and sent out to attack the CCP establishment. By the beginning of 1967
many veterans of the Communist Revolution, who had reservations about Mao's policies
had been branded as "Capitalist Roaders." Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping, Hu Yaobang,
Yang Shangkun and Peng Dehuai were among those who were either removed from their
positions, arrested, publicly humiliated or subjected to public criticism.7 4
However, the forces unleashed by Mao quickly spiraled out of his control. When
Red Guards from Beijing expanded their campaign to the provinces they clashed with local
Red Guards organized by provincial and local CCP organizations. After Mao instructed
the PLA to assist the Red Guards attacking local CCP organizations, his instructions
received an uneven reception. In some areas, such as in Wuhan, PLA sympathies lay
clearly with the forces of order and stability represented by the local CCP organizations.75
72Jonathan D. Spence, The Search for Modern China, New York and London: W.W. Norton & Company,
1990), 603.




Conditions deteriorated further in January 1967 when Mao instructed workers to
form Red Guard units. Student participation in the Red Guards had decimated the
education system in 1966. Mao's 1967 instructions created similar consequences for
industrial production. In addition, the different backgrounds of students and workers
intensified the internecine conflicts among Red Guard units. By the summer of 1968, the
chaos in China compelled Mao to again instruct the PLA to intervene; this time in
opposition to the Red Guards and in order to restore order. In July 1968, Mao disbanded
the Red Guards and sent approximately 20 million former guardsmen to live in the
countryside. 76
The Cultural Revolution demonstrated to a generation of Chinese leaders, the
immense destructive potential of mass movements. Once launched, even Mao was unable
to control the forces of chaos and terror unleashed by the Cultural Revolution. The
Cultural Revolution accomplished Mao's first goal of eliminating, temporarily, the CCP
leadership at the center and at the provincial level--but Mao was unable to replace this
elite with anything but disorder and violence. By 1969 the CCP had become "...an
increasingly dispirited, demoralized, and disunited organization, with its highest echelon
especially riddled with factionalism, and many of its members paying only lip service to the





...none of these developments provided a final solution to the succession question.
The purges of the Cultural Revolution produced not a united Party but a divided one
in which a deep schism of hostility and suspicion separated those who had led the
movement and those who had been its victims.7 8
2. Lin Biao and the PLA, 1969-71
Ironically Mao's attempt to eliminate factional opposition and reinvigorate his
rule had the opposite effect. At the leadership level, factional intriguing was greatly
stimulated. In command of the only institution capable of maintaining order, Defense
Minister Lin Biao became the front runner in the struggle to succeed Mao. Lin recognized
that the key to his success was the expansion and institutionalization of the political role of
the PLA.79 His strategy was three-pronged: weaken or eliminate the power of a sizable
portion of the PLA who objected to his politicization of the military; appoint his
supporters from the PLA Fourth Field Army into key positions80 ; and preserve the
military's autonomy from civilian control.8' Lin also advocated domestic and foreign
policies that he believed would benefit the military officers on whose support he








U.S., arguing instead that a strong military was the best way of "ensuring Chinese security
from a Soviet attack."8 3
Lin's efforts culminated at the Ninth Party Congress in April 1969. Lin was
formally appointed Mao's heir and PLA officers were appointed to 45% of all seats in the
new Central Committee.84 At the provincial level, regional PLA commanders, the only
surviving component of the fused Party/Army elite, increasingly occupied concurrent posts
as first secretaries in provincial CCP organizations.
The two and one-half years following the Ninth Party Congress were
characterized by intense factional conflict between Lin Biao, Jiang Qing and to a lesser
extent Zhou Enlai. Atop this struggle, Mao played the precarious role of "balancer" often
employing other key players that included second echelon civilian officials and regional
military commanders. 85 Each of these groups formed personal alliances and utilized
organizational, social, economic and foreign policy issues to consolidate their position and
weaken rivals in the succession struggle.8 6 To counter Lin Biao's PLA-centered strategy,
Jiang Qing sought to continue the mass movements and promote young radical officials
into key Party and government positions. In contrast, Zhou Enlai espoused the return of
senior officials purged during the early years of the Cultural Revolution and the strict








Lin's preeminent position in the succession struggle began to erode within a year
of the Ninth Party Congress. A temporary accommodation between the Jiang and Zhou
factions convinced Mao to reduce the military's role in civilian politics. At the CCP
Central Committee's Second Plenum in Lushan in August-September 1970, Mao acted to
reduce the military's dominance over the Party and to curb Lin's "...unseemly degree of
personal amnbition."ss During a trip to the provinces in the summer of 1971, Mao charged
that the PLA had become a "cultural army" that neglected its military responsibilities. 89 In
desperation some of Lin's supporters apparently planned to overthrow Mao. The plot was
uncovered and Lin allegedly died in a plane crash in September 1971 while attempting to
flee China.
3. Moderates vs Leftists
Following Lin's demise the uneasy coalition between moderates and leftists
dissipated amidst renewed jockeying to replace Mao. During the period 1971-76 the
fortunes of both groups fluctuated wildly. However the institutional and personnel
programs advocated by each group remained remarkably consistent.
Moderates associated with Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping advocated internal
reform, restructuring of the bureaucracy from the top down and achieving the Four
Modernization's. 90 Their primary aim was to strengthen CCP authority at all levels of
society and rehabilitate cadres purged during the Cultural Revolution. Directly
challenging the leftists, the moderates attempted to restore inter-Party discipline and
reassert direct Party control over mass organizations. In order to further weaken the role
881bid., 302.
89Tbid.
"°Agriculture, Industry, Science and Technology.
35
of the PLA, the moderates sought to remove PLA officials from civilian posts. In their
place, moderates attempted to reinstate newly rehabilitated veteran cadres.91
The leftists generally supported efforts to remove PLA officials from civilian
positions. However they were opposed adamantly to reinstating "capitalist roaders" who
had been purged during the Cultural Revolution. Instead they supported the advancement
of younger, more ideologically-oriented officials who had benefited from Cultural
Revolution. Most importantly, the leftists emphasized the need for continuing mass
movements to provide "mass criticism of bureaucratic officials and their policies,
organized around changing ideological themes."92
Both groups advocated domestic and foreign policies designed to strengthen their
position in the succession struggle. For the moderates, improved ties with the U.S.
weakened the PLA's argument that the military should be bolstered in order to deal with
the Soviet threat. The mechanization of agriculture and economic ties with the West were
blows against mass movements and self-sufficiency advocated by the leftists.
In a significant victory for the moderates, in the Spring of 1973 an ill Zhou Enlai
arranged for the reinstatement of Deng Xiaoping. Deng was identified first as a Vice
Premier and then as a member of the CCP Central Committee. In May 1974 Deng
became de facto Premier93 and in January 1975 a member of the Politburo's Standing
"
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Committee.94 Deng's re-emergence also signaled the return to political life of "thousands
of higher and middle echelon experienced veteran CCP members."95
Deng's efforts to implement some of the moderate policies of Zhou quickly
encountered rising opposition from the Jiang Qing faction. In 1975 Deng launched a
frontal assault on Jiang Qing and her advocation of continued mass campaigns. He
announced that the three instructions of Mao to "study the theory of the dictatorship of
the proletariat; achieve stability and order; boast the economy--formed an organic whole
and should be regarded as a key link in the work of the Party." 96 Jiang Qing, with the
support of Mao, used her control of the official media to launch an intense propaganda
attack on Deng as an "unrepentant capitalist roader."97
The leftists appealed to nationalistic and regional sentiments. They charged that
moderate demands for more centralized economic control and improved relations with the
West represented a broader effort to turn China into a "raw materials supply base for
imperialism and socialism, a market for their commodities, and an outlet for their
investment."98 Leftists warned provincial leaders that "their discretionary powers in
economic and financial affairs would be limited" by Deng's proposals.99
In the face of this assault, Deng was unable to survive the January 1976 death of









disappeared from public view for over one year. One month later, Hua Guofeng was
unexpectedly installed as Acting Premier instead of Deng.
In April 7, 1976 Deng was stripped of all his Party and government posts and
charged with instigating the spontaneous outpouring of popular affection for Zhou Enlai
that occurred in Beijing and throughout China in March-April. During this period,
approximately two million Chinese visited Tiananmen Square to pay their last respects to
the late Premier. On April 4-5 Hua and Jiang convinced Mao that the burgeoning
demonstrations should be dispersed by force. After several skirmishes, police and militia
forces attacked and beat some 10,000 angry people in Tiananmen on April 5.100
Deng was perhaps spared from an even more unpleasant fate when, in a portent
of things to come, Ye Jianying arranged to have Deng taken to Guangzhou' 0o where he
was placed under the protection of the military governor General Xu Shiyou. 102
The death of Mao in September 9, 1976 again demonstrated the precariousness
of clients after the death of their patrons. Jiang Qing's attempt to assume power in the
wake of Mao's death was blocked by the combined efforts of Hua Guofeng and Ye
Jianying. On October 6, Jiang and her key supporters, in what would become known as
the "Gang of Four," were arrested. At a Politburo meeting on October 7, Hua was







The rapid disintegration of Jiang Qing's power following the death of Mao
demonstrated a fatal weakness in the leftist position. Jiang had been unable to expand her
factional connections beyond Mao, mass movements, the media and the militia. Ultimately
Mao's patronage was her only meaningful source of power. Her failure to establish links
within the Party and the PLA can be directly attributed to the savagery with which these
institutions had been subjected during the Cultural Revolution. Despite their success in
mass mobilizations, the leftists underestimated the resilience of the CCP and PLA.
Ultimately they were unable to translate mass movements into effective political power.
...mass criticism could identify programs and cadres that mass organizations
considered to be revisionist, but it could not force officials to change their policies,
remold their political philosophies, or resign from office. In the Cultural Revolution,
Mao had ultimately been required to sanction the overthrow of the entire Party and
state apparatus to order the army to enforce his decision. Neither Mao nor the army
was willing to offer comparable support to the leftists in 1975-76. Instead, the
instruments of power--as opposed to the instruments of protest--remained in the
hands of moderates.10 4
This study of Mao's rise to power, his struggle to keep himself at the top and to
dictate his own successors, shows how he depended totally upon his adroitness in
manipulating individuals and factions in maintaining his dominance over the party
apparatus, government bureaucrats, the army and regional authorities who opposed him.
His ad hoc decisions contributed in no way to a possible institutionalizing of the
succession process. These same shortcomings are evident in the career of Deng Xiaoping.
1°4Harding, Organizing.China, 328.
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C. DENG XIAOPING: TIANANMEN AND BEYOND (1976-1993)
1. Deng's Rise to Power
China under the leadership of Hua Guofeng in late 1976 was confronted with
daunting problems. The economy was at best stagnating, the education system was in
tatters, and society-at-large traumatized by the ten years of the Cultural Revolution. Most
importantly, Mao's vision of China "standing up" under the leadership of the Communist
Party had been discredited. Confronted with this enormous task, Hua offered no new
vision of his own. He was too closely associated with Mao, the Cultural Revolution and
the 1976 Tiananmen Incident to risk a repudiation of these events. Hua appeared capable
of providing only a gentler version of the policies of the past. Keeping faith with the cult
of Mao, he proceeded to construct a gigantic mausoleum for the late chairman in
Tiananmen Square and completed work on the Fifth Volume of Mao's Works. Hua also
attempted to create his own personality cult by mimicking Mao's lifestyle "...and otherwise
appropriating his persona."' 0 5  Hua's position was summed up by his advocation of the
"two whatevers" outlined in a February 7, 1977 editorial:
Whatever policies Chairman Mao had decided, we shall resolutely defend;
whatever instructions he issued, we shall steadfastly obey."' 6
Hua also lacked the factional ties to the PLA or with the growing number of
rehabilitated Party veterans to begin the task of rebuilding the Party and Chinese society.
He could only claim support among some of the younger officials who had emerged
105 Lowell Ditmer, China's Continuous Revolution: The Post-Liberation Epoch 1949-1981, (Berkeley, Los
Angeles and London: University of California Press, 1987), 214.
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durin6 the Cultural Revolution. Even their loyalty was superficial--they supported Hua
only because the alternative, the return of purged cadres, would endanger their careers.
Without a compelling vision or a viable factional network, Hua's legitimacy
rested on the October 7 Politburo nomination and an alleged obscure endorsement from
Mao: "With you in charge, I am at ease."°10 7. Hua badly needed the Central Committee's
imprimatur on his leadership. In order to convene the Central Committee, Hua required
the support of Ye Jianying and Li Xiannian and their factions composed of rehabilitated
veteran cadres.108
The price for Ye and Li's support appears to have been the rehabilitation of
Deng. The Third Plenum of the Tenth Central Committee in July 1977 confirmed Hua's
position as Chairman of the CCP Central Committee and restored Deng to his Party and
government posts. Deng was listed third in protocol order after Hua and Ye Jianying.10 9
Although Deng's return gave Hua a short term respite, it also guaranteed that
Hua would play no more than a brief role as a transition figure. Deng offered a vision and
had the factional connections with the PLA and Party veterans to implement his policies.
Gradually but relentlessly Deng chipped away at Mao's legacy and Hua's legitimacy by
creating the intellectual and political framework for a critical appraisal of the Cultural
Revolution and the introduction of a new set of guiding principles--modernization and
economic development.
Deng was careful to avoid the total repudiation of Mao and Marxist-Leninism





again weakened the PLA and the CCP--his primary tools for controlling Chinese society.
Instead he proposed a pragmatic method of "re-interpreting" Mao's thought by "seeking
truth through facts." 1I0 This approach would breath new life into the CCP. The
supremacy of Mao's teaching would be supplanted by an empirical approach based on
effectiveness and efficiency.
By mid-1978 the rehabilitation of many veteran cadres, most of whom supported
him, emboldened Deng to increase the pressure on Hua. A series of newspaper articles
claimed that Marx, Lenin and Mao Zedong had not believed that their theories and
conclusions were unchangeable. The articles stressed that Marxism must "...continuously
absorb new opinions and conclusions and discard those that no longer fit the situation." Il
The Third Plenum of the 11 th Central Committee in December 1978 was a major
victory for Deng and his moderate supporters. Shortly before the Plenum the 1976
Tiananmen Incident was declared a "completely revolutionary" event, removing another
black mark from Deng's name.'1 2 The Plenum affirmed Deng's vision and implicitly
repudiated Hua's "two whatevers" by calling for the CCP to "shift emphasis of our Party's
work and attention of the people of the whole country to socialist modernization as of
1979."1"3 In addition to laying the foundations for agricultural mechanization and market
reforms, the Plenum promised even further reforms by stressing the role of law and an
independent judiciary in the modernization effort. 114
!1 0 Ibid.





During the Plenum a large number of senior cadres were rehabilitated including
economist Chen Yun (who was named Party Vice Chairman and head of the Discipline
Commission). In addition, Deng supporters Deng Yingchao, Wang Zhen and Hu
Yaobang were added to the Politburo." 15
Coinciding with the Third Plenum was a clear sign of the continuing alienation of
many Chinese intellectuals from the CCP. Deng moved quickly to suppress the
Democracy Wall Movement of November 1978--January 1979 after a series of wall
posters in Beijing evolved from an exposition of the horrors of the Cultural Revolution to
challenging the "fundamental premises of the CCP itself.""16 Deng's message was clear.
Change would be permitted only under the direct control of the CCP.
Following the Plenum, Hua was reduced to little more than a figurehead and
Deng's preeminent position was firmly established. In January 1979 Deng was treated as
a head of state during his trip to the U.S. and meetings with President Carter. In March
1979, Deng promulgated his Four Cardinal Principles 117 considered to be indispensable
for implementing the main task of the Party - the Four Modernizations. Deng's vision of
modernization focused narrowly on economic development. Political power would be
held tightly by the newly regenerated Communist Party--controlled in turn by Deng and
his supporters. There would be an end to "class struggles" and mass movements and no
more traumatic breaks that threatened order and stability.
A key element in Deng 's rise to power was an emphasis on ending the threat to
Party legitimacy represented by the mass movements. Deng succeeded by promising
115Rodzinski, 229.
"16Spence, 664.
!17Maintain the Socialist Road, the dictatorship of the proletariat, the leadership of the Communist Party
and Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong thought.
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economic modernization and the end of ideologically driven mass movements."'
Moderates believed that these movements had damaged the credibility of the CCP and
threatened to plunge Chinese society into chaos. Deng's goals of modernization and
stability were a direct response to the excesses of the mass movements.1 19 However, the
mass movements did serve the important furnction of generati~ig popular support for
policy. The mass movements also contained implicit recognition of the CCP's need to
reflect popular sentiment. By controlling the reigns of power Deng provided stability but
the cost would be a weakening the CCP's ability to explain policy to the people and to
curb bureaucratic excess.
Following extensive but inconclusive CCP rectification campaigns Deng's
succession climaxed with the September 1980 appointment of Deng loyalist Zhao Ziyang
to the premiership and Hua Guofeng's resignation from his top Party and government
posts in November 1980. In June 1981 Hu Yaobang and Deng Xiaoping were formally
elected to Hua's two senior posts. Deng had succeeded Mao.
2. Fracture and Renewed Succession Crisis: Tiananmen in 1989
The early and mid 1980's were a period of rapid econonfic change in China.
Agricultural reforms emphasizing individual profits over Mao's concept of "self reliance"
increased rural productivity by some two hundred and fifty percent by the mid-1980's.12
0
For the first time in her history, China achieved self-sufficiency in grain and cotton.12'
Deng opened China's economy to foreign trade; concentrating on production of consumer
"! 8 Bachm~ia, J058.
1191bid., 1049.




goods for export in place of Mao's development of heavy industry. The establishment of
Special Economic Zones encouraged an influx of foreign investment and advanced
technologies. Industrial production rose at an annual rate of 10.6% and there was a
dramatic rise in the people's standard of living.
The growing complexity of Chinese life was reflected in the emergence of the
separate career paths of many of the younger clients sponsored by Deng into leadership
positions. Hu Yaobang, born to a peasant family, participated as a boy in the Communist
Revolution in the late 1920's and was a veteran of the Long March. As a leader of the
China Youth League in the 1950's, Hu had extensive contact with many of China's most
prominent intellectuals. Zhao Ziyang, the son of a landlord, joined the CCP in the 1930's
and worked as a guerrilla base organizer during the civil war. Following the Revolution,
Zhao rose steadily in the Guangdong Province Party organization and latter as Party
Secretary and political commissar in Chengdu.122 In 1935, Li Peng's father was killed by
the KMT. As a young boy Li was taken in by Zhou Enlai and after the civil war sent to
Moscow where he was trained as an engineer. Li rose to prominence as an expert in
energy matters.123 Among this triumvirate Li was the technocrat, Hu the liberal-
intellectual and Zhao the economist. Although Hu and Zhao had good revolutionary
credentials they shared with Li a lack of any strong ties to the PLA.
In the early 1980's Deng acted to reduce the PLA role in civil affairs and
strengthen Party control over military affairs. In the early 1980's, acting in his capacity as
chairman of the Party's Military Affairs Commission (MAC), Deng attempted to




national defense,"' 24 At the provincial level, Deng ended the practice of "interlocking
directories" in which PLA commanders simultaneously held regional, party, state and
military positions. At the center, Deng reduced the level of military representation in high-
level party organizations.125 Instead, Deng stressed the need for professionalism and
modernization in the military. The PLA was also encouraged to supplement its budget by
engaging in overseas sales of military equipment.
Success placed increasing strains on the factional network created by Deng in the
late 1970's. In the early 1980's, the Chinese leadership was united in opposing any return
to the chaos of the Cultural Revolution and the strong belief of the need for firm party
control over the military. In addition, most of the veteran cadres were personally indebted
to Deng for arranging their rehabilitation. However, despite general agreement on the
need for China to import foreign technology, participate in the international economic
system and increase reliance on market forces, there was a lack of consensus on the speed
and extent to which these goals should be pursued.126
In particular, it had become clear that modernization was not without its price.
China's economy was increasingly vulnerable to world economic trends. Periods of
growth were followed by contractions over which Party and government leaders had little
experience or ability to control. Inflation threatened to eat up many of the hard earned
improvements in the people's standard of living. Economic development was uneven.
Some segments of society and certain regions prospered while the well-being of others
deteriorated. In the rush to become rich, there was a rise in crime and official corruption
124 Harlan W. Jencks, "China's Army, China's Future," China in the Nineties: Crisis Management and
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that many senior Chinese officials associated with increased contacts with the West. Of
equal importance, modernization raised popular aspirations for greater economic and
political reform. Chinese intellectuals demanded greater latitude in examining the CCP's
dominant role in Chinese society.
The factional network established by Deng in the late 1970's began to fracture
over disagreements between reformers including Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang who
favored an acceleration of economic and political reforms and conservatives including
Chen Yun and Li Peng who advocated a more cautious approach that emphasized
maintaining the central authority of the CCP and minimizing the "pollution" of Chinese
Marxist values.' 27 Deng, like Mao before him, acted as a balancing force from atop this
increasing bifurcated leadership elite.
Reforms and retrenchments proceeded in fits and starts from 1982-1986.
Conservatives complaine, after the removal of some price controls and experimentation
with labor incentive systems caused the economy to overheat, creating more
unemployment and a higher rate of inflation. In 1983, in order to appease conservatives,
Deng permitted a campaign to curb the "spiritual pollution" of Chinese society.
Intellectuals were criticized for spreading "corrosive" influences from the West. At the
same time, Deng allowed reformers to proceed with a plans to dismantle the collective
system and implement structural reforms to increase efficiency at the provincial and local
level. 128
In 1986 an unfortunate convergence of economic and political factors began the




successors. Economically, an increase in inflation had created discontent among students
and some workers whose standard of living had been affected adversely. Politically,
student attempts to expand political participation at the local and provincial level political
had been thwarted in 1980, 1982 and 1984 by CCP manipulation of the selection process
for members of the National People's Congress. Determined to succeed in 1986, students
demonstrated in Hefei on December 5, 1986 and a few days later in Wuhan. In Beijing,
demands for greater political freedom combined with protests about poor living conditions
for students and a lack of job opportunities for university graduates.' 29 Protests continued
throughout the country in January, culminating in a massive rally in Tiananmen Square.' 30
In mid January Deng joined conservatives in criticizing the students' actions.
Prominent dissidents Liu Binyan and Fang Lizhi were expelled from the CCP and on
January 16, Hu Yaobang was forced to resign as CCP secretary-general. Steps were
taken to tighten press censorship and a number of "counter-revov ,,.!onaries" were
arrested. Deng had again demonstrated that his vision of economic reforms did not
encompass an increase in political freedom at the expense of the Communist Party.
Despite these measures, intellectuals within and outside the Party continued to urge a
further reappraisal of the Party's role in Chinese society.
Deng's unwillingness to pursue greater political reform overlooked the rise in
political aspirations that inevitably accompany economic development.
129Fairbank, A.Ne istM, 723-724.
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The weakening of the Party's ideological and organizational controls over state
employees, and the emergence of private and collective enterprises outside the state
sector, created the rudiments of a civil society, independent of the state, which was
willing and able to present demands to the government. Unfortunately, the failure to
create new mechanisms for hearing and acting upon those demands meant that
popular grievances would necessarily be expressed outside institutional channels.131
Throughout the year Deng acted to balance the various factions jockeying for
power. Premier Zhao Ziyang was named acting secretary-general to replace Hu. In
November, Deng resigned from the Central Committee in return for the resignations of
conservatives Chen Yun and Peng Zhen' 32. Also in 1987, Li Peng was named acting
premier and General Yang Shangkun was named China's President. Despite the removal
of Hu, Zhao pursued an ambitious economic and political reform agenda. At the CPC's
Thirteenth Party Congress in October 1987 Zhao appealed for far-reaching structural
reforms that included: "The separation of the Party and government .... 1,,33.
Conservative unhappiness with the pace and direction of Zhao's reform efforts
climaxed in his removal from power during the 1989 protests in Tiananmen Square.
Students capitalized on Hu Yaobang's unexpected death on April 15, 1989 to launch
massive demonstrations throughout China to express unhappiness over corruption among
Party leaders and their f , -ilies, the neglect of education and a perceived decline in social
morality.134 The demonstrators called for vigorous economic and political changes. In
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Beijing, the protests coincided with Soviet Premier Gorbachev's May visit to China. A
symbiotic relationship developed between the international press, in China to cover the
Gorbachev visit, and the protesters. In May, after the students were joined by Chinese
from all walks of life, the number of demonstrators in Tiananmen exceeded one million
people.
As he had shown in 1978 and again in 1986, Deng was unprepared to tolerate
dissent that threatened stability and order. In the crisis-filled atmosphere, Deng reverted
to "ad hoc authoritarianism"'135 and factional manipulation to regain control of events. The
CCP Central Committee and Politburo did not meet during the crisis. Instead, all
decisions were made by expanded sessions of the CCP Politburo Standing Committee136
"...without regard for formal decision-making procedures."' 37 Although Deng was no
longer a member of this group, he insisted on participating in its meetings and, according
to some reports, cast the deciding vote against Premier Zhao Ziyang.138 Also during
Tiananmen, key orders to move troops were taken without consulting Zhao who at the
time was concurrently Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission. ' 39
With PLA support provided by Yang Shangkun and conservative support in the
form of Li Peng's high public profile, Deng agreed to use force to suppress the
demonstrations. On June 4, in front of a stunned international television audience, PLA
135Jencks, 151.
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troops brutally attacked demonstrators. Hundreds died and thousands were arrested in the
subsequent crackdown.
Significantly, Deng roles reversed in the 1976 and 1989 Tiananmen protests. In
1976 Deng led popular sentiment after the death of Zhou Enlai. Because of his alleged
role in those demonstrations, Deng was persecuted by radicals and removed temporarily
from power. In 1989 Deng led the forces of repression and removed another popular
figure from power. Among the many casualties of Tiananmen were Deng's legacy and his
carefully laid plans to transfer his leadership to his designated successors. Deng's vision of
a modem and economically advanced China under the leadership of the Communist Party
had been shaken to its foundations.
The Tiananmen Massacre was only one in a series of events that demonstrates the
failure of the CCP to respond to popular sentiment. The massacre highlighted a profound
failure by the Chinese leadership to institutionalize political structures capable of
accommodating the social-economic changes that occurred in the 1980's.140 Economic
reforms had raised popular expectations but political reforms were lacking. In the political
realm, Deng and conservative elders
...refused to alter a CCP organization that had been formed forty years earlier
during the party's struggle for power. The social explosion in Chinese cities
reflected this fundamental 'contradiction' between rapid social change and a rigid
political structure and outworn ideology. Since 4 June 1989, conservative leaders
have attempted to reinforce this highly centralized structure, while dealing with the
enormous political fall-out from the crackdown, particularly a more assertive army




The period immediately after Tiananmen was characterized by renewed factional
politics and political backsliding:
Efforts that had been underway to make the National People's Congress (China's
national legislature) an effective and representative body ground to a halt--indeed
reversed. Efforts to make the rule of law a more fundamental part of daily life prior
to June 1989 were set back in the wave of indiscriminate arrests and detentions, not
to mention the extraconstitutional means by which the decisions to declare martial
law (in May 1989) and to use force (in June) were made.142
Michael Swain has identified no fewer than five senior leadership factions (see
Table I) involved in the struggle to succeed to Deng's power following Tiananmen. Three
leadership candidates were a study in contrasts. Technocrat Li Peng combined expertise
in energy matters with a cautious approach to economics and a conservative political
outlook. However, Li's public image had been damaged fatally by his close association
with the forces of repression during and after the Tiananmen Massacre. Jiang Zemin had
replaced Zhao as CCP General Secretary and Deng as Chairman of the Party's Military
Affairs Commission. A former Mayor of Shanghai, Jiang had no ties to the PLA and with
the exception of his patronage by Deng, no relationship with the central leadership.
Table 1: SENIOR PRC LEADERSHIP FACTIONS
ELDER FIGURE MILITARY CONNECTION LEADERSHIP CANDIDATE




Yang Shangkun PLA General Political Yang Baibing
Department
Chen Yun None Li Peng
Peng Zhen
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Zhang Aiping Third Field Army ?
Defense Industries
PLA General Staff Department
(Chi Haotian)
Yang Dezhi Fifth Field Army ?
Bo Yibo
camwle from Michae Swain MWe MijWy a PWliKca Succesio in am& Le~adeshp inmiution ad Belieft
However, the faction led by President Yang Shangkun, with its strong ties to the
PLA, appeared to be in the strongest position. There were striking similarities in the role
of the PLA in the struggle to succeed Mao and in the post-Tiananmen efforts to succeed
Deng. During the Cultural Revolution and Tiananmen the PLA intervened on behalf of
China's absolute leader, not the Party. 143 Leadership use of the PLA to suppress
demonstrators in Tiananmen temporarily increased the power and prestige of PLA leaders
Yang Shangkun and his half brother Yang Baibing within the ruling elite.144 Like Lin Biao
the two Yangs attempted to expand their influence by appointing allies to key military
posts.
Factional differences were reflected by two broad interpretations of economic
development that emerged during this period. Deng and Jiang Zemin maintained that the
demise of the Soviet Union and the communist nations of Eastern Europe was due to their
inept economic policies.145  They attributed Asian prosperity to benign Confucian
authoritarianism and the relatively open, export oriented economies of Japan, South
Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan. They saw the key to China's economic
14 3Jencks, 150.
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success in a market-determined economy still ruled by the CCP.146 An integral part of this
view was the belief that a peaceful international environment benefited China.
In contrast, conservatives such as Li Peng and Chen Yun, acknowledged the
importance of economics but placed greater emphasis on maintaining security and internal
controls. Conservatives insisted that economic reform should be slowed to avoid risking
political difficulties. The conservative argument contained a heavier element of
xenophobia. First, they insisted that foreign economic exploitation and cultural infiltration
were responsible for most of China's weaknesses. In order to achieve national
development, China should resist all attempts to impose Western values on Chinese
society.' 47 Second, although China needed to acquire foreign technology and strengthen
its military to offset the growing military, economic and political influence of Japan,
contacts should be kept to a minimum. The conservative argument placed greater
emphasis on competition with advanced nations.
3. The Fourteenth Party Congress
By January 1992 Deng had began what may turn out to be his final effort to
ensure an orderly succession to individuals who shared his vision of an economically
modem China under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party. In a bid to secure
control of the CCP's propaganda apparatus, controlled by conservatives since June 1989,
Deng and President Yang Shangkun made well-publicized trips to economic zones in
Guangdong Province near Hong Kong. During the visits, Deng stressed that his "reform
and open door" policies were China's "only way out". He warned that those who opposed
146Goodman, 2.
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these policies "would have to leave the (political) stage."' 43 At the same time Politburo
member Li Ruihuan, a Deng client, urged CCP propaganda chiefs to "encourage liberal
thinking, promote cultural production and stress the primacy of economic
development."' 49  Deng's offensive greatly weakened the prospects of conservative
leadership candidates and appeared to bolster the prospects of Jiang Zemin and Yang
Shangkun.
Following Deng's southern trip Yang Shangkun and his half brother Yang
Baibing' 5 0 apparently tried to expand their factional ties beyond the PLA. At the National
People's Congress in March 1992, Yang Baibing attempted to create the ideological
underpinnings for this expansion by promoting the notion that the PLA's mission was to
"Escort the Cause of Reforms and Opening Up." This slogan was interpreted to allow
greater military participation in China's economic and political affairs.15 1 Yang's advocacy
of a larger role for the PLA created a powerful counter-reaction. His remarks antagonized
many senior PLA commanders, who had not been consulted in advance, and convinced
Deng of the need to remove the Yangs from his succession plans. Deng apparently feared
that the Yang brothers were too eager to fashion a post-Deng regime.
At the Fourteenth Party Congress in October 1992, a fragile Deng Xiaoping
made a brief appearance to place his imprimatur on the military, economic, political and
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150At this time Yang Baibing was Director of the PLA's General Political Department and Secretary-
General of the Central Military Commission.
151"The PLA After the Fourteenth Party Congress," China .NgsAnaLYs,, I February 1993, 2.
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personal decisions that would be announced during the session. Deng's attendance as a
"specially invited delegate"' 5 2 of the PLA emphasized his strong military ties.
The most surprising announcements involved the PLA. Amidst allegation of
abuse of power, Yang Shangkun was removed from his position as first vice chairman of
the CCP and Yang Baibing lost his position as Director of the GSD and Secretary General
of the CMC. Yang Shangkun subsequently resigned as China's President. PLA
representation in the new Standing Committee increased with the appointment of General
Liu Huaqing and Hu Jintao. The appointments of the 76 year old Liu and 78 year old
Zhang Zhen as CMC Vice Chairman underscored Deng's desire for prestigious generals to
counteract the influence of the Yang brothers in the PLA and create a professional,
technically advanced military. 153
The Congress outlined a mission for the PLA that down-played involvement in
politics. The "new" mission of the PLA marked a return to Deng's concept of "army
building." The PLA would remain subject to the Party and would serve the reform effort
by concentrating on military modernization and improving its fighting capability.' 5 4
Following the Congress, an estimated three hundred PLA generals were involved in a
series of personnel changes that exceeded the demotions and purges that followed the Lin
Biao Incident in 197155. Although the two Yangs remain alive and might attempt to
152
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reassert themselves,156 in the short run their faction appears to have been eliminated as a
serious factor in the succession struggle.
The primary focus of the Fourteenth Congress was on economic development.
In his work report General Secretary Jiang Zemin announced a broad consensus to
proceed prudently and gradually toward "a market economy under socialism." Reform of
the political system would be limited to the establishment of a "democratic political system
with Chinese characteristics and not a multi-party and parliamentary western-style
system."'5 7 The importance of Party rectification was lighlighted when Jiang's statement
that the fight against "...corrupt elements who harm the country and the people, and who
must be punished according to the Party rules and the laws of the country, no matter who
they are." elicited the longest ovation from the assembled delegates.
The economic and political lines announced at the Fourteenth Party Congress
were put into operation during the March 1993 meeting of the PRC's National People's
Congress (NPC). During its meetings, the figure-head body NPC amended the PRC's
constitution to officially sanction Deng's open door policy and to stress that the nation
placed highest priority on economic modernization in the form of a "socialist market
economy."' 58
The new Standing Committee of the Fourteenth Party Congress was composed
of former members Jiang Zemin (General Secretary), Li Peng, Qiao Shi, Li Ruihuan, and
new members Zhu Rongji, Liu Huaqing and Hu Jintao. The addition of Deng clients Zhu,
Hu and Liu to the Standing Committee and the dismissal of conservatives Yao Yilin and
156Especially if Yang Shangkun outlives Deng.
15 7
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Song P-g revealed the latest twist in the succession struggle. The position of Li Peng,
already in public disrepute because of his close association with the Tiananmen Massacre,
was further weakened by the departure of Yao and Song. The PLA, for the moment, was
controlled by Deng. The aging leader apparently intended that Zhu, a Deputy Premier,
and former Mayor of Shanghai with a reputation as a cold but efficient manager, would
emerge as a rival to Li Peng. Zhu could also aspire to replace Jiang Zemin should he fail
to establish sufficient ties with the military. This judgment was reinforced when Zhu was
named Acting Premier in the spring of 1993 after Li Peng suffered an apparent heart
attack.
In this new leadership elite, security chief Qiao Shi may well possess the swing
vote between Jiang, Li and Zhu. Jiang Zemin's elevation to the presidency at the Eighth
National People's Congress in March 1993159 made him the first concurrent CCP chief and
president since Liu Shaoqi in 1959. Although Jiang's position in the succession struggle
has been greatly strengthened by this act, his own lack of a personal power base makes his
tenure in office highly precarious.
The struggle to succeed Mao and Deng's rise to power suggest three lessons for
the future. First, Deng's successors in the CCP will be unwilling to follow Mao's example
and change the system from the outside. Second, because Chinese society lacks the
institutional checks provided by a balance of power within the government or a free press,
the means to control the corruption and the bureaucratic isolation decried by Mao are
limited. Finally, absent significant reform within the CCP, popular discontent will manifest
itself in ways that continue to challenge the legitimacy of Communist rule. The lessons of
159
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the Democracy Wall in 1978 and Tiananmen in 1989 are that the CCP is increasingly out
of touch with grass roots political aspirations.
D. THE ROAD AHEAD
Due to the lack of an institutionalized succession process and the preponderance of
factionalism in leadership dynamics, any analysis of future leadership changes must include
fundamental questions about regime legitimacy and survivability following the demise of
its senior leader. As of this writing (September 1993)) answers to the following questions
will shed some light on the enigma of Deng's successors:
1. What effect will China's recent history and traditional reliance on personal
factions have on the succession struggle?
2. Does the CCP still have sufficient flexibility to remain the dominant political
institution in China?
3. What role will the PLA play in leadership change?
4. What will be the impact on the Party, the PLA and the new breed of
technocrats on a leadership having to cope increasingly with the challenges of
regionalism?
If the Cultural Revolution was Mao's last attempt to pass on revolutionary values to a
new generation, then the current emphasis on the development of a "market economy
under socialism" marks Deng's attempt to transfer authority to those dedicated to his
vision of an economically modem China under the strict control of the Chinese
Communist Party. Like Mao, Deng has become disillusioned with and dismissed several
potential successors. It is unclear whether the present contenders in the succession
struggle, Jiang Zemin, Zhu Rongji and Qiao Shi will develop sufficient personal ties in the
Party and the PLA to survive the death of their patron or whether they are destined to play
59
a transition role similar to Hua Guofeng. Their failure could create new opportunities for
Li Peng, Yang Shangkun and perhaps even Zhao Ziyang. Equally important, external
challenges to CCP legitimacy raise doubts about the ability the Party to remain the
predominant institution in the PRC.
The struggle to succeed Mao, underscores that "no succession arrangement should be
considered final or unchangeable."'160 Factional jockeying for position is bound to
accelerate as press reports concentrate on Deng's increasing infirmity.' 6' Unanticipated
events such as the death of party elder Wang Zhen in March 1993 and Premier Li Peng's
current incapacity due to an apparent heart attack will further influence the intense
factional maneuvering to replace Deng.162 As the struggle intensifies, the perspectives of
the leadership contenders will be shaped primarily by the following factors.
1. Factions and Organizations
Deng's failure to strengthen the rule of law and weaken the role of factions and
factional networks ensures that the succession struggle will involve intense factional
maneuvering involving the CCP, the state bureaucracy and the PLA. Among the
leadership elite this struggle will overshadow other domestic and foreign policy
considerations.
Unless a strong leader establishes firm control over the
Party/Government/Military apparatus and communicates an acceptable vision to the
160Harding, Organizing Cina, 297.
161
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Chinese people, the leadership will be reactive rather than proactive. Decision-making in
China will be characterized by the need for faction patrons to reward their clients and by
interfactional compromises and shifting alliances of factional networks.
Because Chinese society lacks the institutional checks provided by a balance of
power within the government or a free press, the means to control the corruption and the
bureaucratic isolation decried by Mao are limited. Faction patrons will find it difficult, if
not impossible, to curb high level corruption involving senior officials or members of their
immediate families. The corruption and abuse of power of so-called "Cadre Kids," the
offspring of senior officials, will continue unabated. If unchecked, this corruption will
elicit new extra-systemic protests that challenge the legitimacy of CCP rule.
In order for the CCP to retain its grip on power it must deal with the internal
problems posed by corruption and bureaucratic excess and by external challenges arising
from increasing political aspirations. Internally the Party will be challenged by the military
and the huge bureaucracy. External challenges will come from advocates of greater
pluralism and greater regional autonomy.
2. The Role of the Communist Party: Survival and Legitimacy
Will the CCP disintegrate like the communist parties in the Soviet Union and
Eastern Europe or does it retain sufficient flexibility to remain the ruling party of China?
The fate of the CCP is not irretrievable. The CCP is unlikely to follow the path
of the Soviet Communist Party or Communism in Eastern Europe. Recent history
suggests that the CCP retains sufficient flexibility to cope with the challenges posed by
rapid economic development and rising political aspirations. Though ideological content
may fluctuate, the name--CCP--is likely to endure.
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a. The Soviet Model
China's economic success and the difficulties in translating mass movements
into sustained political power make it unlikely that the PRC will follow the paths of the
Soviet Union or the communist states of Eastern Europe..
Economic stagnation played a major role in the collapse of Communism in
the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. China is currently enjoying a period of
unprecedented economic expansion. The economic reforms instituted by Deng Xiaoping
in the 1980's have doubled workers' nominal wages and tripled farmers' inComeS.163
Ordinary Chinese far greater access to consumer goods and improved housing have
translated into the biggest economic boom in China since the revolution.'64 These
economic reforms have brought about real improvements to the people's livelihood.165
With 1993 GNP expected to increase 14-10 percent and industrial production for the first
six months of 1993 up 25 percent, Chinese authorities are more concerned about curbing
growth than with stagnation.' 66
In the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe economic and political reform were
attempted simultaneously. Economic reform was rapid and often chaotic. The abolition
of many price supports in the former Soviet Union caused a decline in the standard of
living. At the same time, political reform meant that people had a channel to express their
grievances without fear of repression. The result was the disintegration of Soviet
authority.
163Harding, A Fragile Relationship, 216.
164Ibid., 217.
165 Goodman, 14-16.
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China's economic reforms predate those in Eastern Europe and the former
Soviet Republics. These reforms have been implemented gradually since 1979 and have
caused fewer dislocations and discontent than the reforms in Eastern Europe. Even before
the economic reforms of 1979, Communist rule had made tangible improvements "in
health care, food consumption, and housing"' 67 in China. In addition, China's economy
has been far more closely linked to world markets than the economies of Eastern Europe
and the former Soviet Union. As a result, Chinese officials have far greater expe,:u-nce in
international business and penetrating foreign markets.' 68 From June 1992-June 1993
China attracted US$11 billion in new foreign investments' 69
Periodic economic slowdowns in China have created pressures different than
those in Eastern Europe. When expectations exceeded improvements in economic
conditions in the second half of the 1980's
...leading to considerable feelings of relative deprivation, particularly amongst the
urban work-force. Such frustrations clearly led to demonstrations in 1989 but they
are very different to those which occurred in Eastern Europe, but not least because
they are more likely to be directed at the regime rather than the state itself.' 70
Secondly, China's experience before and after Tiananmen has shown that
mass movements are difficult to translate into political power. In the short run as long as
China's economy is vibrant and its leaders determined to remain in power, there is little
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Throughout its history, the Chinese Communist Party has possessed
remarkable resiliency and ability to change. Deng Xiaoping's selective interpretation of
Mao and Marxism-Leninism to permit "Socialist Market Economics" is the latest
indication that pragmatism is alive and well in China.
However, CCP legitimacy has been weakened by the current leadership's
inability to communicate a coherent political ideology that takes into account the influx of
controversial ideas from abroad and the increased popular political consciousness that
accompanies rapid economic development.
...the process of economic reform produces new interest groups, adversely affects
powerful traditional groups (like state-enterprise workers) and generally gives rise to
increasing demands on the regime.
There are two broad approaches to handling these demands. One is through
repression (the 1989-92 approach); the other is to allow the expression of these interests
and channel them into newly constructed political and legal institutions.'17
New Chinese leaders must add a political component to Deng's vision of
economic modernization. An important element in this new vision should be an official re-
appraisal of the Tiananmen Massacre. In the same way that Deng found it necessary to re-
examine Mao's role and the Cultural Revolution before he could proceed with economic
modernization, the wounds of Tiananimen obstruct the CCP's ability to maintain its
legitimacy.
Order and stability will be preserved if new Chinese leaders incorporate
political reform into the existing CCP/government structure. Opening the Party would be
a long term process that could entail granting some real decision making authority to
17 lConable and Lanpton, 140.
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members of the National People's Congress and the Politburo. The process for selecting
representatives to these bodies could be widened to more accurately reflect popular
aspirations. An important goal would be to accommodate some of the more moderate
opposition positions that include aggressively curbing corruption.
Without these or similar changes, the immediate prospect for CCP rule is for
a further erosion of its legitimacy. Successful economic reforms will continue to give rise
to new political forces within and outside the CCP. The new CCP leadership wishes to
preserve law and order and keep its leadership intact. It will have to respond to the
seething demand for reform in the political as well as the economic sphere.
3. The Role of the PLA
The PLA will inevitably play an important role in the struggle to replace Deng.
Due largely to the emergence of separate Party, state and military career paths, none of
leadership candidates being groomed by faction patrons have extensive ties to the PLA.
Since a leadership candidate's "...ability to survive the death of his elder patron(s) depends
heavily upon the strength and breadth of his contacts among his military
counterparts .... "1 72 China's elder leaders will find it necessary to both manipulate and court
the PLA.
The personalized, highly centralized nature of the PLA's command and control
system may increase its susceptibility to manipulation by elders.
172Swain, 173.
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This system is shown to embody most of the basic characteristics of the politico-
military system as a whole: It is highly personalized, centralized along vertical lines,
and compartmentalized. As a result, it presents major irregularities in procedure and
potential ambiguities in authority relationships that could prove highly destabilizing
in the event of a future leadership crisis at the center, especially one involving the
breakdown of elder control and the emergence of open splits among the successor
leadership.17 3
The PLA's importance in factional disputes may increase its leverage in two
areas: maintenance of order and increased military prerogatives. During the Cultural
Revolution and Tiananmen, PLA forces acted to restore order and stability represented by
the rule of the current supreme leader. Both cases demonstrate the military's "traditional
fear of chaos and the heightened awareness of the PLA's importance as the final guarantor
of social order."174 In future crises, the PLA is likely to play a similar role.
The PLA is not a monolithic organization. Reports before and after Tiananmen
indicate some dissension within the military leadership about the role of the PLA in
crushing popular dissent. In the future, younger officers, themselves the products of the
PLA's modernization and professionalism campaigns, may resist attempts to involve the
military in factional disputes that might further erode the PLA's domestic image. Well
aware of the damage done to the PLA because of Tiananmen, they might be particularly
hesitant to accept instructions from outside the formal chain of command. The possible
widespread existence of such sentiment, combined with greater professional training and




exclusively on formal command and control channels in a future leadership crisis.175 Such
developments would on one hand favor an entrenched leadership while at the same time
encouraging these leaders to pursue moderate policies that seek to accommodate popular
sentiment.
One possible method of appealing to younger officers would also coincide with
the goals of senior military leaders. Expanding the PLA's economic interests and
prerogatives might retain the loyalties of officers committed to the modernization and
professionalism of the armed forces. Their interests would be furthered by continued
increases in defense spending in the areas of equipment procurement, salaries and support
facilities. Budget outlays could also be bolstered by granting the PLA increased latitude in
weapons sales decisions and by allowing the military to retain a greater proportion of the
profits derived from these sales. A minimum objective would be to ensure that the
military's standard of living keeps pace with comparable sectors of the PRC's rapidly
increasing economy.
Increased defense outlays and force modernization raises wiie specter of expanded
use of the military to achieve national objectives. A stronger PLA might tempt more
nationalistic senior factions to strengthen their position in the succession struggle by
authorizing the employment of the PLA beyond China's borders. On the other hand,
increased military leverage in the succession struggle might allow the PLA to resist
factional attempts to launch high risk military adventures that jeopardize military
resources.
In sum, the PLA will be a political factor in the leadership struggle and beyond.
The military will tend to support moderate factions that maintain order and stability by
17 51bid., 133-134.
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accommodating popular sentiment. At the same time, the military will be in a better
position to demand an increasing share of the state budget and an expansion of overseas
weapons' sales.
4. The Role of Regionalism
Regionalism as a centrifugal force is not unprecedented in China. During the
1920's and the 1930's regional and local warlords controlled large areas of China with little
regard for the instructions of the 'central' government.
China's size, geographic barriers and long history have created major sub-cultures
possessing different dialects, diverse eating habits and even distinct burial practices. In
addition, many of China's ethnic minorities are clustered in areas along its western border.
Chinese leaders have been particularly sensitive about the influence of the collapse of the
Soviet Union and establishment of new states adjacent to China composed of ethnic
groups that also live in China.
China's efforts since the mid- 1980's to move from centralized economic planning
toward some form of a free market economy mandated greater economic decentralization.
Economic reforms aimed at creating a 'socialist' market economy require a reduction of
central control in economic activities. Local governments at the provincial and municipal
levels have been permitted to: a) retain a greater share of revenues generated by local
enterprises; b) attract foreign investment; c) conduct foreign trade; d) retain foreign
exchange revenues; and e) make domestic investments. 176
Economic decentralization, coupled with economic prosperity and increased local
wealth has encouraged a redistribution of power from Beijing to the provinces. Harry
Harding has commented that:
176Harding, A Fragile Relationship. 145 and 305.
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The declining legitimacy of the central government has affected the attitudes and
behavior of provincial officials, just as it has changed those of urban workers and
intellectuals. Peking (Beijing) is much less able to enforce local compliance with its
decisions than in the past, the provinces are becoming a powerful lobby in the
shaping of national policy. As yet there has been little open defiance of the central
government. But if Peking's authority continues to weaken, the line between quiet
evasion and outright insubordination could be crossed more frequently.
Pressures for greater autonomy and even formal independence are rising in many
of China's border regions. The Dalai Lama has demanded independence for Tibet
unless Peking accords Tibet virtual autonomy in its internal political, economic, and
cultural affairs. Calls for independence in Xinjiang have already been heard and
could become more vocal if the Islamic republics of the Soviet Union, such as
Turkestan, secure greater autonomy from Moscow. The upsurge of democracy,
economic reform, and nationalism in the Mongolian People's Republic could
encourage similar demands in the Inner Mongolian region in China.177
Nowhere has the growth of rcgional power been more apparent than in southern
China's prosperous Guangdong and Fujian provinces. Fueled by investments from Hong
Kong and Taiwan these two provinces have far outstripped the economic performance in
the rest of China. One danger that could arise would be that economic disparities might
cause different regions to see foreign relations in a different light than the rest of the
China. For example, might Guangdong Province be unwilling to fund heavy defense
spending that might damage its relations with trading partners in Taiwan, Hong Kong or
Southeast Asia?178
In addition, regional disparities contribute to a perception that some provinces
are not participating in economic development and an equally strong belief that poor
provinces are restraining the more successful ones.
1771bid., 305.
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Concerns about a regional breakup of China are further heightened by reports
that local officials have imposed illegal taxes on impoverished peasants in parts of Sichuan,
Guizhou and Anhui Provinces.179 Recent reports of excessive local taxation and local
governments ignoring central instructions on the economy demonstrate the extent of
decentralization. Other reports claim that some young cadres are refusing central-level
positions in order to take more lucrative regional positions.' 8 0 There have even been
reports of a 'warlord businessman' in Henan province.181
What then is the likelihood that China will splinter into regional units?
Despite signs of greater decentralization and increased regional autonomy, there
are few signs that China is on the brink of disintegration. A prosperous economy in
Guangdong is unlikely to inspire armed revolt against the central authorities in Beijing.
Regional disparities may be temporary. There are signs that foreign investors, particularly
those from Taiwan, are expanding their operations into areas outside southern China in
search of reduced costs. In addition, Japanese and South Korean investors are
increasingly active in Dairen and the Northeast China. According to one official Xinhua
report, in the first six months of 1993, South Korean investors committed US$210 million
to establish 310 enterprises in Liaoning Province in northeast China.' 8 2 In addition, poor
provinces may provide markets for more developed ones.
179Sheryl WuDunn, "China is Sowing Discontent With "Taxes' on the Peasants," New York Times, 15
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Central authorities have recently demonstrated the willingness and ability to rein
in abuses of regional authority. In June 1993, the CCP permitted the release of a series of
reports detailing negative peasant reactions to local abuses of power. Some of the reports
implied that unauthorized local fund raising had hindered central efforts to curb inflation
by driving up interest rates.18 3
The Politburo has taken steps to reduce local corruption and prevent the
economy from overheating.' 8 4 In addition to limiting loc.,d lending and bond issuance, the
new measures prohibit the confiscation of peasant's property and ban local authorities
from charging over 40 fees for such activities as militia training, social welfare programs
and public construction projects.' 8 5 Reformist Vice Premier and People's Bank of China
Governor Zhu Rongji has dispatched work teams to the provinces to audit local financial
institutions and pressure them to accede to the central plan to slow economic growth.' 8 6
China's state run media have also condemned some local officials for mishandling
economic reforms and abusing their powers.
Firm central control of the military appears ensured by frequent rotation of senior
commanders aad greater attention to the living conditions of troops. Because of reforms
instituted in the 1980's, regional PLA commanders are less involved with regional political
and economic affairs than they were during the Cultural Revolution.' 8 7 The PLA is more
resistant to regionalism than at any times in its history due to such reforms as the
183United Press International. 22 June 1993, Compuserve Newsmid Service.
184China News A y, No. 1489, Hong Kong, July 15, 1993, 4.
185Far Eastern Economic Review, 10 June 1993, 14.
186Nicholas D. Kristof, "China, Barreling Along the Capitalist Road, Now Posts Strict Speed Limits,"
New York Times, 23 July 1993.
187Jencks, 158.
71
implementation of national command-control-communications, logistics, and educational
systems. Absent the complete collapse of central authority, it is unlikely that China will
return to the 'warlordism that plagued China earlier in this century.
However, China's future ruling elite must deal with the consequences of
decentralization. Central opposition to decentralization would inhibit economic growth
and likely encounter greater regional resistance. New leaders will face strong pressure to
translate legitimate regional aspirations into central institutions and policies. The
Fourteenth Party Congress took a preliminary step in this direction by including six
representatives of major provinces and cities into the twenty-three member Politburo.' 88
In the long run the breakup of China into regional centers will depend less on economic
decentralization and more on the center's response to the needs and aspirations of its
citizens at the local level.
18 8 Lam.
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IV. LEADERSHIP CHANGE AND THE CROSS STRAITS RELATIONSHIP
A. EVOLUTION OF CROSS STRAITS POLICIES
A key objective of the PRC has been to establish its control over Taiwan. Since
1949, the PRC has employed military force twice against offshore islands controlled by tVie
RCC.18 9 Beijing has steadfastly refused to renounce its claim of the right to use of force
to effect reunification. Will a post-Deng regime on the mainland continue this policy; and
will a new administration make any significant shifts in the cross straits relationship?
For Beijing, KMT dominance of Taiwan represents the last, uncompleted phase of the
Chinese Communist Revolution. A Taiwan not ruled by Beijing is also an unpleasant
reminder oi China's humiliating experience during the nineteenth century at the hands of
the West and Japan. More importantly, KMT rule of Taiwan is perceived as a direct
threat to Communist rule of the mainland. In the years immediately after 1949 this threat
was primarily a military one as KMT leaders schemed to retake the mainland by force.
Recently this threat has become far more subtle. Taiwan's increasingly pluralistic political
system and strong economy provide an alternate Chinese model for forces within the PRC
dissatisfied with Communist rule.
Prior to 1979, the PRC sought unsuccessfully to compel the KMT to enter into
negotiations by weakening the island's political and military ties with the United States.19°
Mao Zedong took a long term view to re-unification. He is quoted as saying that it did
1a9Harding, A Fragile Relationship, 346.
19Ibid. 140.
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not matter if Taiwan took one hundred years to rejoin the mainland.191 However,
following U.S.-PRC diplomatic normalization, Deng Xiaoping indicated a grez ter sense of
urgency. In a 1980 speech he listed re-unification as one of the PRC's three prinary
objectives of the decade. Deng may have been influenced by Taiwan's rapid economic
development or by the growing realization that reunification would be more difficult to
achieve over time.192 Beijing combined this new sense of urgency with new tactics and a
series of more flexible reunification formulas.193 Although the PRC had first called for
peaceful reunification in January 1979, the full scope of its plan did not emerge until 1981.
On September 30, 1981 then NPC Standing Committee Chairman Ye Jianying proposed
the establishment of cultural and economic exchanges between the two sides. In these
"Nine Points" Ye called for negotiations between the CCP and the KMT aimed at a
settlement whereby the KMT would accept PRC sovereignty over Taiwan. In return
Beijing would agree to allow the island to maintain its own armed forces, retain its present
economic and social systems, and send representatives to the central government in
Beijing.194 Ye stressed that Taiwan could maintain "a degree of autonomy" in a reunified
China.195 Deng Xiaoping personally called for party-to-party talks on June 26, 1983 and
191 Nathan, China's Crisis, 154.
19 2Ibid.




on May 15, 1984 Zhao Ziyang formally applied the concept of "one country, two systems"
to Taiwan.196
Despite these signs of moderation on the part of the PRC, the ROC government
consistently rebuffed the PRC's overtures. The ROC maintained a strict "Th..,r No
Policy" (no contact, no negotiations, no compromise). Visits to the mainland, trade, direct
mail and telephone links were prohibited.' 97 As late as mid-1987, most ROC citizens were
prevented from direct travel to Hong Kong as part of the ROC's efforts to stop its citizens
from visiting the mainland.
However, the ROC was clearly on the defensive in responding to the PRC's call for
cultural and economic exchanges. The combination of the PRC's more relaxed attitude
and its economic reforms appealed to Taiwanese businessmen and elderly mainlanders on
Taiwan who proceeded to ignore the ROC's restrictions.198
The resulting upsurge of unauthorized investments and covert travel created an
increasingly powerful second channel of interaction between the two sides. This second
channel has effectively nullified many government policies and acted as a catalyst,
encouraging the two sides first to relax restrictions and later facilitate cross straits
contacts.
Shortly before his death in January 1988, ROC President Chiang Ching-kuo instituted
a series of reforms that had a far reaching affect on the growth of cross straits ties.
Chiang lifted Martial Law, relaxed restrictions on remittance of foreign exchange and
196Carol Lee Hamrin, Amy Wilson and Moti Pinkasovic, China: Inportant Statements on Taiwan
Reunification Since NormaliZation of US-China Relations: A Chronology, (unpublished and unclassified
State Department document, September 1985).
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75
instructed Taiwan's Bureau of Entry and Exit to accept applications from ROC citizens to
visit Hong Kong and Macao. Later in the year, the ROC's Red Cross Society began
accepting applications for ROC citizens to visit relatives on the mainland.199
Although Chiang Ching-kuo's motivations for allowing increased mainland contacts
are unclear, his decision to open relations with the mainland came at a crucial time for
Taiwan. The ROC economy had been growing rapidly and the island was prospering.
Foreign reserve holdings were among the highest in the world. At the same time the
island was becoming the victim of its own success. A chronic labor shortage was driving
up wage rates. Land prices on the island were skyrocketing. Environmental awareness
was rising and many groups were organizing to block new heavy polluting investments in
their localities. Taiwan was threatened with decreasing international competitiveness.
Taiwan businesses needed to move offshore or Taiwan's economic miracle might stall.
Taiwanese businessmen had various alternatives in Southeast Asia but low wage rates
and the familiarity of doing business in a Chinese environment made the mainland
particularly -ppealing. Aggressive Taiwanese entrepreneurs invented relatives and used
mainland visits to arrange business opportunities. 200 Although technically illegal, the ROC
government "...basically turned a blind eye to the 'mom and pop' operations that
increasingly flout(ed) investment restrictions." 20 1
Chiang Ching-kuo played a pivotal role in implementing the reforms of 1986-7. With
his impeccable credentials as the son of KMT patriarch Chiang Kai-shek, Chiang Ching-
kuo's involvement added a degree of legitimacy in the eyes of the Taiwan's Mainlander
199 "Chronology-Pragmatic Adaptations," Free China Review, Vol. 41 No.1 January 1991, 15.
200Lo,7.
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dominated political and military elites that would have been lacking if the process had
begun under Chiang's successor as President, Lee Teng-hui - a native Taiwanese.2° 2
After assuming power, President Lee effectively sounded the "death knell"2 03 for
Taiwan's Three No Policy. In May 1990 Lee acknowledged the legitimacy of the
communist regime in Beijing and proposed government-to-government talks. In addition,
Lee has called on the mainland to abolish its four cardinal principles (which promote
socialism and the dictatorship of the Communist Party) and abandon its claim of the right
to use of force against Taiwan.2°4
The rapid expansion of cross straits contacts particularly business and investment,
"...provided a key stimuli for new shifts in Taiwan-mainland relations."20 5 Indirect trade,
conducted primarily through Hong Kong, increased from US$320 million in 1980 to
US$1.1 billion in 1985, and then to US$2.7 billion in 1988. Mainland investments usually
undertaken by dummy Taiwan corporations headquartered in Hong Kong, amounted to
approximately US$450 million by 1988.206
After large quantities of mainland folk medicine, dried fruits and other agricultural
goods began to appear in local Taiwan markets, the ROC government acted in August
1988 to allow the indirect import of some agricultural and industrial raw materials. The
Ministry of Economic Affairs (MOEA) belatedly attempted to develop a new policy to
20 2Li Teng-hui's background epitomizes the blending of Japanese and Western cultures with southern
Chinese culture that has occurred on Taiwan. Li grew up in Taiwan during the Japanese colonial period;





2o6Harding, A Fragile Relationship, 157.
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regulate economic relations with the mainland. 207 MOEA's action in February 1990 to
permit Taiwan entrepreneurs to undertake market survey trips and participate in mainland
trade exhibitions did little more than highlight its new attitude toward mainland contacts
by legitimizing the already wide-spread activities of Taiwan firms in these areas. MOEA
also relaxed Taiwan's policy on the import of PRC cultural works, relics, and research
materials.208
The ROC government has created institutional mechanisms to cope with the
explosion of mainland contacts. In November 1990, Taipei formed a Mainland Affairs
Task Force (later changed to the Mainland Affairs Committee) to coordinate a
governmental response to trade and investment on the mainland. The Mainland Affairs
Task force drafted new legislation and coordinated government agencies response to trade
cultural and cross straits ties.2°9 In an attempt to regulate entry and exit, marriage,
inheritance, correspondence, communications and business relations with the mainland, in
November 1990 the Executive Yuan approved a draft Mainland Relations Law.
In 1991, Taiwan's new position on mainland relations was formulated with the
approval of the "National Unification Guidelines." The Guidelines envisioned three stages
leading to reunification but set no timetable. In the first stage the PRC would renounce its
claim to use force against Taiwan, mutual trust would be strengthened by private
exchanges and the peaceful resolution of disputes. In the second stage, there would be
high-level official contacts and direct commerce. Taipei's objectives, summed up in
2 0 7 Silk, 43.
2 0 8 Ibid.
209Lo, 8.
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President Lee's "one country, two governments" proposal was PRC recognition of the
ROC's de facto jurisdiction over Taiwan.210
At the same time, an "unofficial" organization, the Straits Exchange Foundation
(SEF) was created to act as an intermediary in dealing with the mainland. One year later
Beijing responded by forming an "unofficial" counterpart organization, the Association for
Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS). Cooperation between the Straits
Exchange Foundation (SEF) in Taiwan and the Association for Relations Across the
Taiwan Strait (ARATS) on the mainland mark an important step toward institutionalizing
cross straits interaction.
In 1992, these "non-governmental" bodies held two working level meetings in Beijing
and Hong Kong to discuss such practical issues as document notarizations and handling
registered postal items. 211 As a result of these meetings, the two organizations established
regular written, FAX and telephone communications. 212
In April 1993, the heads of ARATS and SEF conducted two days of "unofficial" talks
in Singapore. These talks were the highest level meetings of the two sides in 45 years. 213
The different objectives of both sides were evident from the moment the two delegations
arrived in Singapore. ARATS officials publicly called for reunification and urged the
conclusion of economic agreements including permitting direct trade and transportation
links. ARATS officials also reiterated China refusal to abandon its claim of the right to
21
°Julian Baum, "Flags Follow Trade," Far Eastern Economic Review, 17 September 1992, 20-21
2 11Liaowang Overseas Edition, 4 January 1993, 3-4, trans. EBIM 2 February 1993, 78.
2 12Ibid.
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"Taiwan, China End Historic Talks Without Agreement," MIl, 28 April 1993, Cmouserve Newsgid
Service.
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use force. 214 SEF representatives focused on non-political issues constraining cross straits
interaction. They advocated an agreement on technical issues that provided protection for
Taiwan businessmen's investments in the mainland.
In the end each side got something but neither side achieved all of its objectives.
Taipei refused Beijing's overtures for greater political content to the talks and the two
sides were unable to reach an investment protection agreement. However, the meeting
itself represented a victory for Beijing's long-sought after hegotiations with Taiwan. For
the ROC, the arrangements during the talks, including an exchange of seats between Wang
and Ku halfway through the final signing ceremony, implied the equal status insisted on by
Taipei. 215 The two sides agreed on formalizing SEF-ARATS communication, cultural,
scientific and technological exchanges. 21 6 They also promised to work closer to curb
crime, illegal immigration, fisheries disputes and protect intellectual property rights, and
facilitate journalists and young peoples exchanges21 7 SEF president Ku Chen-fu and
ARATS chairman Wang Daohan promised to meet again in the near future.
B. PRESENT SCOPE OF RELATIONS
Since late 1988 both Taiwan and the China mainland have accrued concrete benefits,
in terms of profits and prestige, from the profusion of ties between the private sector in
Taiwan and regional interests on the mainland.
214Frank Ching, "Taiwan Has Regained Initiative in Dealing with the Mainland," Far Eastern Economic
Review, 13 May 1993. 38.
215Frank Ching, "China, Taiwan Vie for Support of Chinese in North America," Far Eastern Economic
Reiew, 8 July 1993, 28.
216
"Taiwan, China End Historic Talks Without Agreement," UPI, 28 April 1993.
217Nicholas D. Kristof, "Starting to Build Their First Bridge, China and Taiwan Sign 4 Pacts," NewYor
TimNs, 30 April 1993 and "Wang-Koo Meeting: A Historic Step," Bgifing Rie, 10-16 May 1993,4.
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Statistics on Taiwan-mainland interaction are frequently unreliable. Much of the
trade and investment across the straits is technically illegal and Taiwan businessmen in
particular have gone to great lengths to conceal many of their activities. In addition, many
trade and investment activities occur indirectly through overseas subsidiaries of Taiwan
firms and may be incorporated into trade and investment statistics of other countries.
Most observers estimate that in 1992 two way trade amounted to US$7-8 billion although
the managing director of the Hong Kong Taiwan Trade Center has estimated that 1992
two way trade between Taiwan and the mainland amounted to US$10 billion.218
According to the PRC's official Xinhua News Agency, during the period January to
September 1992, Taiwan businessmen invested US$2.97 billion in 3,750 mainland projects
raising Taiwan's total mainland investments to US$6.5 billion. Taiwan is now the third
largest investor in the mainland after Hong Kong and the U.S.219 Investments ranged
from light manufacturing to real estate, construction, high technology and services. 220 In
1992, Xinhua reported that representatives from more than two thirds of Taiwan's 100
largest companies had visited the mainland.
New trade patterns have emerged and some traditional relationships have resumed.
Taiwan businessmen realize cost savings by shipping semi-finished products to China via
Hong Kong for final or partial assembly: some of these items are then returned to Taiwan
for shipment overseas. Senior officials at one large Taiwan corporation which produces
materials used in the production of appliance casings, estimate that they export US$100
million of their product to mainland factories each year. Not coincidentally, many of their
2 18Zhongguo Tongxun She, trans. EBIa, 19 January 1993, 71.
2 191bid., 70. Other sources speculate that Taiwan has already displaced the U.S. as the second largest
investor in the mainland.
2201bid.
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mainland customers formerly operated similar factories in Taiwan. 221 In another case
President Enterprises, Taiwan's largest producer of processed foods is engaged in a joint
venture with the People's Liberation Army to grow tomatoes in Xinjiang Province. 22Z The
largest and highest profile Taiwan investment, a planned US$7 billion petrochemical
complex by the Formosa Plastics Co., has been put on hold after encountering serious
opposition from the ROC government. Formosa Plastics Co. officials have been quick to
point out that their fir.n was simply following its former Taiwan customers to the
mainland. 223
In related developments, Taiwan managers are in great demand to supervise
investments in mainland factories. Mainland agricultural products including fresh crabs,
dried mushrooms and Chinese folk medicines are widely available in local Taiwan markets.
Relationships have grown in other areas as Taiwan visitors have come to the mainland
"...to see the sights .... to conduct scientific, technological and cultural exchanges, do
business and make investments, seek medical services or to attend school."224 In 1987,
275,000 Taiwan residents visited the mainland. The following year another 450,000
2 2 1Conversations with Taiwan businessmen 1989-1993.
2221p, Beijing 7 February 1993 and Carl Goldstein, "The Bottom Line: Taiwan Capital, Factories Pour
Into China," Far Eastern Economic Review, 17 September 1992, 23.
223 Interview with Formosa Plastics officials.
224Liaowang Overseas Edition, 16 December 1991, trans. EM, 3 January 1992, 60.
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followed. 225 According to PRC estimates more that 1.2 million people from Taiwan
visited the mainland in 1992,226 up from one million in 1991.227
Other 1991 statistics include: the repatriation via Red Cross channels of 3,345
mainland Chinese attempting to enter Taiwan illegally; unofficial visits to the mainland by
members of the ROC's Legislative Yuan, National Assembly, Control Yuan, ruling KMT
and opposition DPP parties; mainland visits by 116 Taiwan cultural exchange groups
involving 887 people in the first ten months of 1991. In addition, during 1991 more than
100 Taiwan sports delegations, composed of 2,000 people, visited the mainland.
Cooperation between Taiwan and mainland TV stations has enabled audiences on both
sides of the straits to watch the same live TV show, and there were 200 publication
cooperation agreements and joint publication of more than 100 titles. During the same
period, Taiwan received 12 mainland cultural groups and hosted 13,000 mainland visitors,
including journalists. 228
Statistics fail to describe the depth or complexity of these contacts. Prior to departing
Taiwan, tourists may visit stores and select and pay for gifts for relatives. After arriving in
the mainland, the items are delivered to them.229 With the advent of Hong Kong's Star TV
satellite service PRC nightly news broadcasts are now available to a wide spectrum of
Taiwan society. Taiwan TV features reports from its own journalists speaking to PRC
citizens in remote areas of China including the Three Gorges and Dunhuang. Academics
225Harding, A Fragile Relationship 158.
226Wang Zaixi, "Taiwan's Situation in 1992 Reviewed," Liaowang Overseas Edition, 11 January 1993,
9-10, trans. FBiS, 2 February 1993, 75.
227Ibid.
228Ibid., 60 and 68.
2291nterviews with Kaohsiung travel agents.
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from both sides attend conferences and engage in low key academic exchanges.230 In one
recent case, during a visit to Taipei, Shen Shitun, the president of the Beijing Aerospace
University, proposed a number of aviation and aerospace projects with Taiwan firms. 2 3'
Members of Taiwan Kiwanis and other social clubs travel to the mainland for golf outings.
Religious pilgrims from Taiwan journey to the home of the god Matsu on the mainland.
Mainland meats and foodstuffs are sold openly in Taiwan markets. Taiwan deep-sea
fishing boats are crewed by PRC citizens. The Taiwan boats not only pick up and
discharge PRC crewmen in third countries but also put into small mainland fishing ports
such as Pintang Island off the coast of Fujian where they pick up and discharge crew
members. 232
Eased standards have led to a rise in cross straits crime. Smuggling is widespread233;
Taiwan police officials attribute an influx of weapons and drugs into the island to mainland
sources.234 Charges of piracy have been leveled against parties on both sides of the straits.
During the period 1987-1992, the ROC seized 21,476 illegal immigrants and repatriated
most of them to the PRC.235
Although the vibrancy of this relationship has somewhat blurred the political
differences between Taipei and Beijing, there still exits a fundamentally different set of
assumptions driving the long term objectives of the two governments. For the ROC, these
2 3 0FR, 29 December 1992,79.
23 lIO1tin.Sh, 17 January 1993, trans. MI S, 2 February 1993, 76.
232Julian Baum, "Nets Across The Strait: Driftnet Fishing Thrives Under Chinese Flag," Far Eastern
Economic Review, 8 July 1993, 23.
2 3 3
"Smuggling Cases on the Rise in China," UMI, 10 February 1993, Compuserve Newsgrid Service.
2341nterview with Kaohsiung police officials.
2 3 5 China News Agency, 9 February 1993, in FBIS, 9 February 1993, 68-69.
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ties reduce tensions and the likelihood of a military confrontation with the PRC. The
relationship provides Taiwan businessmen with a favorable investment oppostunities and a
potentially large market. In sum the economic and social relationships are ends in
themsleves.
For Beijing the immediate goal is economics, the long term is political re-unification.
The intermediate step is negotiation on a party-to-party basis aimed at re-unification.
Taiwan's growing political pluralism has undermined a key assumption underlying Beijing's
re-unification strategy. The KMT alone is no longer capable of concluding any re-
unification agreements with the PRC. Taiwan's political realties are such that any
agreement with the PRC must command the widespread popular support that only the
island's governmental institutions can provide.236
C. HONG KONG AS ENTREPOT
Hong Kong has played a key role in facilitating the cross straits relationship. In the
absence of direct transportation and financial links, Hong Kong emerged as the entrepot
for people, goods and services moving between Taiwan and the mainland. In a. little
researched area, Hong Kong banks have probably acted as the central intermediary in
transferring funds from Taiwan companies to their investments in the mainland.
Due primarily to the flow of goods and services to and from the mainland, in 1991
Taiwan ranked as Hong Kong's fourth largest trading partner and Taiwan's second largest
export market after the U.S.237 Nearly 20 percent of all arriving visitors in Hong Kong
were from Taiwan. 238
2 36Nathan, China'sCrisi, 153.
237Pamela Baldinger, "The Birth of Greater China," The China Business Review, May-June 1992, 17.
2388bid.
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The post-1997 role of Hong Kong in cross straits interaction is unclear. Progress on
direct transportation and financial links may diminish Hong Kong's importance as other
Chinese cities establish their own shipping and communications links with Taiwan. Should
Taiwan-mainland negotiations bog down, Hong Kong might continue to play a central role
after 1997. Hong Kong's Basic Law allows the British colony to retain its current system
for fifty years after 1997. This provision might prove to be a boon to Hong Kong
intermediary role between Taiwan and the mainland.
Taiwan has long maintained an uneasy relationship with Hong Kong. In the past,
ROC citizens have complained at the treatment that they receive from Hong Kong officials
as they transit Hong Kong for the mainland. The ROC's presence in the colony has been
very low key. Taiwan's affairs are handled by the Chung Hwa Travel Service, and the
official ROC Government Information Service is represented by its publication, The Free
China Review. 239
In anticipation of 1997, the ROC has taken steps to define its new relationship with
Hong Kong. Taipei is drafting a law for consideration by the Legislative Yuan specifying
Taiwan's relationship with Hong Kong. An encouraging sign is Beijing's 1991 agreement
permitting the ROC's Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) to establish a Hong Kong office
corresponding roughly to the mainland's own office called the Department of Hong Kong
and Macao Affairs. 240
The present cross straits relationship is full of dilemmas for Taipei and Beijing. The
leadership equation on both sides of the straits is subject to change. Nevertheless, a
239Ibid.
24°Frank Ching, "Taiwan is Drafting Legislation To Govern Ties With Hong Kong," Far Eastern
Economic Review, 1 July 1993, 28.
86
summary and conclusions, or preliminary observations about the future, seem to be in
order.
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V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
It is unlikely that the fast growing relationship between Taiwan and the China
mainland will lead to political unification. The distinct political, social and economic
forces at work on both sides of the straits make it doubtful that new generations of leaders
in Taipei and Beijing will be willing to undertake the risks assoxiated with poittical
unification. However, short of a declaration of Taiwan independence or the collapse of
central authority in Beijing, both unlikely, cross straits interaction will expand and propel
both sides to increase bilateral cooperation.
The cross straits relationship presents both opportunities aad problems for future
leaders in Taipei and Beijing. The operational codes of each leadership elite will play an
important role in determining the perceived costs and benefits of this relationship. These
operational codes will differ significantly from those of their predecessors. A key
ingredient in the operational code of Taiwan's new leaders will be the unique influence of
southern Chinese, Japanese and Western cultures on the island's Taiwanese majority. The
operational code of the next generation of leaders on the China mainland will be affected
by the need of technocrats from narrow bureaucratic backgrounds to establish factional
networks that span the CCP, State bureaucracy, and the PLA. The long run challenge for
both sets of elites will be satisfying the traditional desire to maintain order and stability
while simultaneously sustaining economic development and dealing with rising political
aspirations.
The impetus for the cross straits relationship has come from the private sector on
Taiwan and at the local and regional level on the mainland. These groups form a powerful
constituency that benefits from expanded ties. In the past, this constituency has forged
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ties that compelled a leadership response. A lesson for the future is that changes in the
relationship will not always occur at a pace and in areas dictated by the leaderships. In
many cases, leaders in Taipei and Beijing will be forced to respond to initiatives
undertaken by these groups. Nevertheless, the cross straits relationship will be influenced
by clearly identifiable factors contained in the operational codes of new leaders in Taipei
and Beijing.
A. THE INFLUENCE OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN TAIWAN
The next generation of Taiwan leaders will be selected by an increasingly pluralistic
system but one which remains biased heavily in favor of the ruling KMT. By admitting
Taiwanese into leadership positions, co-opting moderate opposition policies, relaxing
political controls and utilizing its overwhelming financial and propaganda resources, the
KMT has perpetuated its rule in Taiwan. In so doing, the underlying rationale for KMT
rule has shifted away from the premise that the ROC will someday re-capture the China
mainland. The KMT's new legitimacy rests on its ability to provide effective government
that reflects the aspirations of the residents of Taiwan. This new legitimacy has
transformed Taiwan's political landscape.
A key element in effective government is the primacy of law and institutions over
personal relations and factions. The gradual relaxation of political controls has stimulated
the growth of a free press, opposition political parties and private associations whose
primary focus is on Taiwan. On one hand, these organizations help the KMT identify and
address salient issues. On the other hand, they pose a potential challenge to KMT rule and
could take over the government should the ruling Party falter.
The development of law and political institutions represented by the emergence of
these organizations precludes any meaningful re-unification talks between the KMT and
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the CCP. An active opposition and a free press have begun the process of separating the
KMT from the ROC's government apparatus. Any attempt by the KMT to engage in
direct negotiations with the CCP concerning the status of Taiwan would jeopardize the
KMT's grip on power. In an increasingly pluralistic Taiwan where law and political
institutions constrain factions and personal relations, any negotiations with the PRC must
command the overwhelming support of the Taiwan populace. This support could be
mobilized only by a popularly elected government 1,erceived as acting in the best interests
of the people of Taiwan. No ROC government could sustain popular support unless it
entered into negotiations as an equal to its PRC counterpart.
Strong popular support for re-unification in a prosperous and pluralistic Taiwan is
unlikely. The people of Taiwan will ascertain their interests in terms of their prosperity
and security. Their perceptions will be Taiwan-centered--ties with the China mainland will
be judged beneficial only when they enhance Taiwan's economic prosperity and do not
threaten to undermine the island's political institutions.
Attempts at political re-unification would threaten both Taiwan's prosperity and
security. The relatively tiny and affluent Taiwan population would be overwhelmed by the
sheer size of the mainland's population and any acknowledgment by Taiwan of its
subservient position to Beijing would invite future interference in the island's political and
economic processes. Promises by Beijing that Taiwan could retain its political and
economic autonomy offer no new incentives to the people of Taiwan. In addition, such
assurances are questionable given Beijing's current hardline policies toward Hong Kong.
Reflecting popular opinion, the ROC's leadership elite is increasingly Taiwan-
centered--its primary objective is improving the security and welfare of the residents of
Taiwan. These leaders will be less inclined to undertake potentially risky steps toward
political reunification and equally unwilling to proclaim Taiwan independence. While they
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will endorse publicly Lee Teng-hui's proposals for reunification, they will actively pursue
only those objectives that facilitate contacts. Closely affiliated with the Taiwanese
business community, these Taiwanese KMT leaders see tangible benefits in expanding
cross straits trade, investment and social interaction. However, they view economic and
social ties as ends in themselves, not as the beginning of a process leading to political re-
unification.
Taiwan's lack of international recognition of a political status com. -nsurate with its
economic power will continue to frustrate the island's leadership but is unlikely to lead to
an overt declaration of independence. The PRC's diplomatic efforts to isolate Taiwan are
the main stumbling block to increased international recognition. These efforts are likely to
be stimulated not constrained by a formal declaration of independence. The KNIT also
needs to accommodate the numerically small but still politically influential block of
Mainlander voters. Although the Mainlander wing of the KMT will exercise
disproportionate but decreasing influence particularly on military and security issues, it is
still sufficiently strong to discourage new leaders (as evidenced by the recently formed
New Party) from deviating sharply in public from its current stance.
Further economic development on the mainland will not provide sufficient incentives
to persuade Taiwan's ruling elite to enter into re-unification talks with Beijing. The
growth of the notion of a separate Taiwanese identity, fueled by Taiwan's economic
success and long separation from the mainland, will constrain any form of political union
that acknowledges Beijing's sovereignty over the island. The Taiwanese attitude toward
the mainland can be likened to a Canadian view of the United States. The two societies
share a similar culture and engage in close economic cooperation but the numerically
smaller society steadfastly resists any actions that might weaken its national identity. The
Taiwan leadership's attitude toward re-unification and independence is perhaps best
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summed up in a popular saying: "Unification is what you can say but don't do;
independence is what you do but can't say."
B. THE INFLUENCE OF DEVELOPMENTS ON THE MAINLAND
Power in the People's Republic of China is gradually shifting "...from an older
generation to a younger one, from state to society, and from center to provinces."24' At
the leadership le, A this shift will be characterized by intense factional maneuvering, the
necessity of strengthening the legitimacy of the CCP, and the need to accommodate
regional autonomy. Accompanying these challenges will be a daunting array of problems
that includes the return of Hong Kong, population pressures on the environment and an
economy and society increasingly vulnerable to outside forces. All of these problems will
demand careful leadership attention.
Since there is no institutionalized succession process, the succession contest will be
fought on a wide front. The CCP, the PLA, the technocrats and the bureaucracy will play
important roles in the struggle. Contending factions will utilize foreign, domestic and
personnel policies to bolster their positions. All of these policies will be subordinated to
behind-the-scenes factional maneuvering.
The next generation of Chinese leaders will not possess the broad-based personal
experience and ties that Deng and Mao built up through the years and used to consolidate
their power. They lack the prestige of having participated in the Chinese Communist
Revolution. Most of the leadership candidates favored by Deng are technocrats who have
specialized in the economy, not ideology or Party organization. Since these contenders
for top leadership positions represent narrow bureaucratic constituencies, they will need to
generate continuing payoffs to retain members in fluid networks that span the CCP, State
241Harding, A Fragile Relationship, 301.
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bureaucracy and the PLA. Their ability to reward network members will be greatly
enhanced by policies that promote continued economic progress. Any new leader will
have to work constantly at expanding his own support base. These factors make it highly
likely that the new leadership will be even more pragmatic and committed to economic
reform than Deng. 242
Despite challenges posed by the Tiananmen protests in 1989 and the Democracy Wall
movement in 1978-79, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) remains entrenched atop
China's political system--at least in the short run. The next generation of China's leaders
will be self-selected by senior members of the Party and PLA's ruling elite. A crucial
problem confronting future leaders of the PRC will be continuing, or better still
strengthening, the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party. In the late 1970's and early
1980's Deng successfully made his vision of modernization through economic reform the
underlying rationale for CCP rule. In order to accommodate the rising political aspirations
that have accompanied economic development, new leaders will have to add a political
component to Deng's vision that includes a critical re-appraisal of the 1989 Tiananmen
Massacre. Unless the CCP undertakes political reforms better to reflect popular opinion,
external challenges to the CCP's preeminent position will intensify.
Leadership ability to sustain economic growth and bolster the CCFs political
legitimacy will play a key role in managing regional autonomy. An expanding economy,
under the leadership of the central government, minimizes regional frictions. If the CCP
can gain and sustain popular acceptance it will be in a better position to eliminate official
corruption and other abuses of power at the provincial and local level that have generated
recent unrest in rural areas.
24 2Bachman, 1050.
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The first lesson drawn from these challenges and problems is that re-unification with
Taiwan will not be the most important issue confronting any new leadership elite in
Beijing. In the light of the pressing need to consolidate factional networks, strengthen the
legitimacy of the CCP while simultaneously incorporating Hong Kong into China, and
dealing with discontent caused by abuses of power at the provincial and local level,
political re-unification with Taiwan may even receive low priority. No powerful
bureaucratic entity in the PRC has a compelling interest in political re-unification.
Preoccupied with more pressing issues, PRC leaders will be reluctant to develop new
policy initiatives 243 or make major concessions aimed at opening re-unification talks. They
also will be unwilling to risk straining weak factional links to the PLA by launching risky
military operations designed to pressure Taiwan. Instead, Chinese leaders may engage in a
form of incremental problem-solving that broadens and facilitates existing ties but
obscures the PRC's ultimate political objective.
A second lesson is that economic benefits from cross straits ties will enhance the
ability of faction patrons to reward their clients. Regional interests, the PLA and
influential members of the CCP and State bureaucracy already benefit from the cross
straits interaction. They form a powerful lobby opposing any action that might threaten
existing ties. They will also exert pressure on the leadership to surmount problems that
hinder the expansion of trade and investment.
C. THE INTERNAL DYNAMIC OF CROSS STRAITS RELATIONS
Despite the absence of a compelling interest in political re-unification, the increasing
scope and complexity of cross straits contacts constitutes a dynamic that will stimulate
greater cooperation between Taipei and Beijing. Increased capital-intensive investment
243 1bid., 1054.
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from Taiwan awaits a bilateral investment agreement. Problems involving trade and
investment disputes will require formal arbitration processes. Narcotics trafficking,
smuggling, piracy and other forms of cross straits crime can be solved only by joint police
and military efforts between the ROC and PRC. The flow of illegal mainland laborers into
Taiwan has already resulted in the development of a de facto immigration agreement
between the two sides. A host of other problems including fisheries rights and cross
straits marriages can be resolved only by closer governmental interaction. The eventual
opening of direct communication and transportation links will intensify pressures for closer
cooperation.
Taiwan's aggressive business community and powerful regional interests on the
mainland have demonstrated the ability to expand cross straits ties well beyond the scope
envisioned by officials in Taipei and Beijing. Coping with the myriad details involving the
large-scale movements of people and goods between Taiwan and the mainland will
demand far more extensive institutional arrangements than currently exist between the
Straits Exchange Foundation and the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits.
While the precise nature of such institutional arrangements cannot be foreseen, over time
these institutions will exert pressure on future leaders in Taiwan and the mainland to solve
problems and expand mutually beneficial ties.
This combination of the powerful forces expanding cross straits ties and the absence
of incentives for new leaders in Taipei and Beijing to pursue overall political integration
may lead to the evolution of an entity that is less than a modem-nation state but more than
a trading bloc . What may emerge is a distinctly Chinese entity that is integrated by a web
of economic and social ties but which lacks a common political framework.
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